Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1990

The State of Utah v. David R. Warden : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Darwin C. Hansen; Morgan and Hansen; Attorney for Appellee.
Melvin C. Wilson; Davis County Attorny; Brian J. Namba; Deputy Davis County Attorney; Attorney
for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Warden, No. 900087.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2878

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

LKJCUMtNl

BRIEF

KFU

45.9
.S9
DOCKET NO.

&&«7
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
DAVID R. WARDEN,

Case No.

De f endant/Appe11ee.

qODOf 7

P r i o r i t y No* 14

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Second Circuit Court, Layton Department
Hon. K. Roger Bean, Judge

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
BRIAN J. NAMBA
Deputy Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
Farmington UT 84025
Attorney for Appellant
DARWIN C. HANSEN
Attorney at Law
Morgan & Hansen
8th Floor, Kearns Building
136 South Main
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Attorney for Appellee

i

1 LMIMS

AUG 7 1990
Clerkf Supreme Court, Utah

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

vs.
DAVID R. WARDEN,

Case No.

Defendant/Appellee.

Priority No. 14

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Second Circuit Court, Layton Department
Hon. K. Roger Bean, Judge

MELVIN C. WILSON
Davis County Attorney
BRIAN J. NAMBA
Deputy Davis County Attorney
P.O. Box 618
Farmington UT 84025
Attorney for Appellant
DARWIN C. HANSEN
Attorney at Law
Morgan & Hansen
8th Floor, Kearns Building
136 South Main
Salt Lake City UT 84101
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page #
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

ii

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1

•.....'

OPINION BELOW
PROVISIONS

OF

2
CONSTITUTIONS,

STATUTES,

AND

RULES

INVOLVED

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

9

ARGUMENT
POINT 1

10
10
THE RULING OF THIS PANEL OF THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF OTHER
PANELS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THAT IT WEIGHED
EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT WHICH WAS
CONTROVERTED BY OTHER COMPETENT EVIDENCE. (10)

POINT II

17
THE RULING OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IS IN
CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN
THAT THE COURT LOOKED BEYOND THE EVIDENCE MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY VERDICT. (17)

POINT III
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW A SUBSTANTIAL
AND UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK OF DEATH BY VIEWING THE
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
VERDICT. (22)

22

CONCLUSION

31

ADDENDUM

.....

32

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASE AUTHORITY:
Funkhouser v. Oklahoma. 763 P.2d 695 (Okla. Cr. 1988) . . . .

28

Neitzel v. State. 655 P.2d 325 (Alaska App. 1982)

19

People v. Phillips. 414 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1966)

28, 29

State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct App 1989)

10

State v. BMG Corporation. 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985)

22

State v. Bolsinaer. 699 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1985)

19

State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985)
State v. Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah 1989)

17, 30
. . 2, 17

State v. Hallet, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980)

27

State v. Hoffman, 639 P.2d 567 (Montana 1982)

27

State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980)

17

State v. Linden. 657 P.2d 1364 (Utah 1983)

17

State v. Maxfield. 677 P.2d 519 (Idaho App. 1984)

30

State v. McClain. 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985)

2, 17

State v. McPhee. 684 P.2d 57 (Utah 1984)

27

State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983)

18

State v. Ruben. 663 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983)
State v. Rupp. 586 P.2d 1302 (Ariz. App. 1978)
State v. Tolman. 775 P.2d 422 (1989)
State v. Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1989) .

16, 19
27
1, 10
2, 17,
18, 27

State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah App 1989)
State v. Williams. 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. App. 1971)

18, 30
28

Steele v. Breinholt. 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 1, 10
Walker v. Superior Court (Peopled. 763 P.2d 852 (Cal. 1988) . 28
ii

STATUTORY AUTHORITY:
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1974)

2

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1973)

3

Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 et sea. 1953, as amended

1

OTHER AUTHORITY:
Homicide—Lack of Medical Attention, 100 A.L.R.2d 483 (1965)

iii

28

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellant,

:

v.

:

DAVID R. WARDEN,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Case No.

:

Priority No. 14

Brief of Appellant

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
1. Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court
to hear this appeal by Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 et sea. 1953, as
amended.
2.

This appeal is from the decision of the Utah Court of

Appeals, reversing the jury verdict of the Second Circuit Court of
Davis County, Layton Department.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.

Is the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this

matter in conflict with earlier decisions of the Court of Appeals,
namely, State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422 (1989), holding that the
existence of contrary evidence or of conflicting inferences does
not warrant disturbing the jury's verdict?

See also Steele v.

Breinholt, 747 P.2d 433, 436 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
2.

Is the ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals in this

matter in conflict with rulings of the Utah Supreme Court, namely,
1

State v, Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah 1989), holding
that

"... where there is any evidence, including reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from it, from which findings of all
elements of the crime can be made beyond a reasonable doubt, our
inquiry is complete and we will sustain the verdict"?

See also

State v. McClaln; 706 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah 1985).
3. Is there sufficient evidence to show a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of death by viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the jury verdict?
OPINION BELOW
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals in State v.
Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Utah App. 1989), as published in the
Utah Advance Reports appears as Appendix A to this petition.

A

copy of the Court of Appeals official opinion published as 784 P. 2d
1204, appears as Appendix B to this brief. A copy of that court's
order denying the State's petition for rehearing appears as
Appendix C.
PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES INVOLVED
1.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1974)
Definition of "criminal negligence or criminally
negligent".
A person engages in conduct:
* * *

(4)
With criminal negligence or is
criminally negligent with respect to circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would
2

exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.
2.

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1973)
Negligent homicide.
(1)
Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
negligence, causes the death of another.
(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, David R. Warden, was charged with Negligent

Homicide, a class A misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206
(1973).

The defendant was initially tried by jury in the Second

Circuit Court, Layton Department, beginning on November 16, 1987;
however, the Court declared a mistrial on November 18, 1987 due to
improper testimony given by one of the State's witnesses. A second
jury trial was held beginning February 22, 1988, which continued
through February 26, 1988. Defendant was convicted of the offense
of Negligent Homicide as charged.
The case was reviewed by the Court of Appeals and on
November 22, 1989, the Court ruled by written opinion that the
conviction should be reversed on the basis of insufficiency of the
evidence,

based

upon

the

State's

failure

to

establish

a

"substantial and unjustifiable risk of death."
The State's petition for rehearing was denied without
comment (Appendix B ) .
The State petitioned this court for a Writ of Certiorari
and that petition was granted.

The case is now before this court

upon writ of certiorari.

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant was charged in the Fourth Circuit Court, Layton
Department, with the negligent homicide of Jareth Youngf the infant
son of Joanne Young,
Joanne Young is a citizen of England and came to the United
States in July of 1984, when she was fifteen years old (T.Vol.II,
p.39).

During the month of March 1986, she became pregnant at the

age of seventeen years (T.Vol.Ill, p.40).
In July 1986, Joanne went to Dr. Mark Bitner, a board
certified obstetrician/gynecologist, who confirmed that she was
indeed pregnant.

Dr. Bitner established the projected date of

confinement at about December 21, 1986 (T.Vol.II, p.175). Joanne's
recollection was that the due date was December 19th (T.Vol. Ill,
p.43).
Joanne learned that the defendant did home deliveries and
decided she wanted a home delivery because she was too embarrassed
at being pregnant out-of-wedlock and did not want to go to a
hospital and have people know (T.Vol.TII, p.48).
Joanne

first

(T.Vol.Ill, p.50).

went

to

Dr. Warden

on

September

8th

He established her due date as being December

17th (T.Vol.Ill, p.53).

Joanne was not given any instruction by

Dr. Warden as to what to do should anything unusual occur nor was
she given instruction as to the care of the baby (T.Vol.Ill, p.57).
At approximately 8 o'clock on the morning of November 7th,
Joanne discovered she was having cramps and was bleeding an amount
of blood consistent with a heavy day of a normal menstrual period
4

(T.Vol.Ill, pp.60-63).

Joanne's mother, Ivy Young, made a phone

call to Dr. Warden, who was at the University of Utah attending a
football game. Dr. Warden told her not to worry, that Joanne was
in labor (T.Vol.I, p.61).

He instructed her to call back at 1:00

p.m. (T.Vol.I, p.62).
Ivy called again at 1:00 p.m. (T.Vol.I, p.64) and was told
not to bring Joanne to the clinic (T.Vol.I, p.65).

Ivy phoned

again at 4:00 p.m. to inform the defendant that Joanne was losing
blood clots, at which time he told her to "stop fussing" (T.Vol.I,
p.66).

Ivy called again at about 10:15 p.m. to tell the defendant

that Joanne was in the last stages of labor (T.Vol.I, p.67).
The defendant arrived at the Young home at approximately
10:30 p.m. (T.Vol.I, p.68) and the baby, Jareth Young, was born
within a matter of minutes (T.Vol.Ill, p.74; also T.Vol.I, p.76).
Ivy then weighed the infant on the bathroom scales and reported to
Dr. Warden that the weight of the baby was about four pounds
(T.Vol.I, p.73).
Soon after the birth, Ivy noted that the infant made
unusual sounds, "like a pig grunting" (T.Vol.I, p.78).

She also

noticed that the hands and torso of the baby were purplish-blue
(T.Vol.I, p.79).

Ivy repeatedly requested that Defendant check

Jareth (T.Vol.I, pp.73,82,83,84). Defendant diagnosed the baby as
suffering from respiratory distress syndrome (T.Vol.Ill, p.98) and
decided not to hospitalize the baby (T.Vol.IV, pp.175-177).
Defendant remained at the Young home for about an hour.
The only instructions he gave to Ivy Young was to watch the baby
5

through the night (T.Vol.1, p.86) and if she needed help to call
(T.Vol.II, p.115).

He did not tell her that the baby could die of

the respiratory condition (T.Vol.IV, p.184).
In the morning when Jareth's condition had deteriorated,
Ivy

Young

attempted

to

contact

the defendant

at

his

office

(T.Vol.I, p.95), at his home (T.Vol.I, p.96), and again at his
office (T.Vol.I, p.98) with no success.
Finally,

she

contacted

her bishop

in the LDS

church

(T.Vol.I, p.98), who responded with a pediatrician, Dr. Kramer
(T.Vol.I, p.101).

The infant was transferred to the hospital but

died soon thereafter (T.Vol.I, p.104).
The State Medical Examiner, Dr. Edwin S. Sweeney, testified
that Jareth Young died of Respiratory Distress Syndrome, due to
prematurity (T.Vol.Ill, p.13).

He opined that the weight of the

child . was

(T.Vol.Ill, p.15), and

about

four pounds

that the

gestational age of the baby was 33-34 weeks (T.Vol.Ill, p.34).
According to Dr. Kramer (T.Vol.II, p.247) and Dr. Branch
(T.Vol.Ill, p.162),

there is no recognized

specialty

in home

delivery in the State of Utah.
Dr. Frank Kramer, a board certified pediatrician who came
to the home at the request of the LDS bishop and attended the
infant until his death at Humana Davis North Hospital, testified
that based upon the physical size of the baby, one could tell it
was not a well child (T.Vol.II, p.276).

Dr. Kramer testified that

the baby should have been hospitalized immediately following birth
(T.Vol.II, p.277), and that Jareth Young was obviously premature
6

(T.Vol.11/ p.280).

Finally, Dr. Kramer testified that the local

hospital, Humana Davis North, has a policy that a mother should be
sent to a center with an intensive care unit if the mother is felt
to be less than 35 weeks of gestation (T.Vol.II p.281).
Dr. Ware Branch, an obstetrician/gynecologist for the
University of Utah, testified that he teaches obstetrics at the
University of Utah College of Medicine, teaching general principles
of obstetrics to medical students and residents and understands the
standard

of

care

of

both

general

practitioners

and

other

specialists in the area of obstetrics (T.Vol.Ill, pp.162-163). The
general principles in that regard do not vary from a doctor
practicing in a hospital setting as opposed to a home setting
(T.Vol.Ill, p.164).
When given hypothetical facts equivalent to the situation
of this case up to 8s00 a.m. on November 7, 1986, Dr. Branch
indicated that the standard of care would be to see the patient for
evaluation for the use of Tocolysis, or stopping labor (T.Vol.Ill,
p.179).
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dr. Branch
about the standard of care regarding leaving a baby in Jareth's
condition with the family at home, and Branch replied, "... in my
opinion, this baby has to be observed in the hospital setting..."
(T.Vol.Ill, p.225).
Finally, Dr. Branch in evaluating the course of action
taken by Dr. Warden, stated, "... what would I tell a resident in
training? He better not ever, ever do that again or I'll see to it
7

that he's on the street."

He then elaborated, "Well, I mean, I

have, in discussion with you here today, disagreed with the
prospective management of the events of the 7th of November, and I
would disagree with them again." (T.Vol.Ill, p.225)
Further, he stated, "I think that the judgment decision to
leave a small, quite likely premature baby in the hands of someone
who doesn't really have any medical experience, I think that
judgment is far too liberal for these times and I wouldn't do
that."

(T.Vol.Ill, p.227)
Dr. Gary Chan, a neonatologist for the University of Utah,

testified that he has taught interns and residents in training, in
pediatrics, family practice, anesthesiology, and obstetrics, and is
familiar with the standards of practice in all of those areas
(T.Vol.Ill, p.235), and further, that the standard would not vary
from a hospital to a home-birth setting (T.Vol.Ill, p.276).

He

stated the standard of care for a baby of four pounds and 33-34
weeks gestation age "... would certainly be admitted to a newborn
intensive care i^nit."

(T.Vol.Ill, p.239)

Given a hypothetical circumstance consistent with that of
the birth of Jareth Young, Dr. Chan stated that if Jareth were
immediately in his care in the hospital intensive care unit, the
probability of survival would have been 99 per cent (T.Vol.Ill,
p.248) .
Dr. Chan also stated that any physician should be able to
recognize if the baby was in respiratory distress (T.Vol.Ill,
p.249) and failure to treat the baby would result in increased risk
8

of mortality to five, ten, or fifteen per cent (T.Vol.Ill, p.250).
When asked if it would be within the standard of care in
this area for physicians to leave that baby in a home setting with
a layperson monitoring the progress of that baby immediately after
birth, Dr. Chan's response was, "Absolutely not." (T.Vol.Ill,
pp.256, 273). He later stated the risk of death to a baby left in
the care of a layperson would increase 10 to 20 times.
Dr. Chan stated the grunting sound was symptomatic of
respiratory distress (T.Vol.Ill, p.276).

It is possible to adjust

the position of the baby to eliminate the sound, but it does not
affect the exertion of the baby or the progress of the disease
(T.Vol.Ill, p.277). This testimony was in direct contradiction to
Dr. Warden's.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Appellant advances three arguments in support of it's
position that the Court of Appeals decision be reversed.
(1) The ruling of this panel of the Utah Court of Appeals
is in conflict with rulings of other panels of the Court of Appeals
in that it weighed evidence favorable to the defendant which was
controverted by other competent evidence.
(2) The ruling of the Utah Court of Appeals is in conflict
with rulings of the Utah Supreme Court in that the court looked
beyond the evidence most favorable to the jury verdict.
(3) There is sufficient evidence to show a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of death by viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE RULING OF THIS PANEL OF THE UTAH COURT OF
APPEALS IS IN CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF OTHER
PANELS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IN THAT IT WEIGHED
EVIDENCE FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT WHICH WAS
CONTROVERTED BY OTHER COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
The Utah Court of Appeals opinion properly cites State v.
Tolman, 775 P.2d 422 (Utah 1989) as a standard of review, but fails
to recognize the rule regarding conflicting evidence:
Although contrary evidence was presented,
"[t]he existence of contradictory evidence or
conflicting inferences does not warrant disturbing
the jury's verdict." Tolman at 424, 425.
That rule has been consistently recognized by other panels
of the Court of Appeals.

See Steele v. Breinholt, supra, at 436;

State v. Arroyo, 770 P.2d 153 (Utah Ct App 1989).
The Court of Appeals opinion, in reversing on the issue of
sufficiency
paragraphs.

of the evidence, summarized

the evidence in five

Nearly all of the evidence relied upon by the court

was contradicted in the evidence presented.

Those five paragraphs

are reproduced below along with examples of the contradictory
testimony:
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION

EXCERPTS FROM TRIAL TRANSCRIPT

Defendant testified at trial
that the grandparents weighed
the newborn baby and determined
it to be about five pounds.
Defendant
also
said
he
believed the baby to be two to
three weeks premature.

Dr. Sweeney, State Medical
Examiner:
A: 1.86 kilograms, 2.2 pounds
per kilogram off the top of my
head that would be about four
pounds, but I don't have a
calculator.
The Court: I gen 4.092 working
it out here at the bench.
The witness:
So it would be
about four pounds one ounce,

10

approximately.
T.Vol.Ill, p.15
Dr Sweeney, State Medical
Examiner:
Q:
Did you come to a conclusion as to how long it had
been in the uterus prior to
birth?
A: I did.
Q: What was that conclusion?
A: That it was consistent with
approximately 33 to 34 weeks
with 40 normally being the
number that is used for full
term.
T.Vol.Ill, p.7
Dr.
Kramer,
State's
Pediatrician:
Q:
When you did that
measurement, what conclusion
did you come to?
A: Based on weight, height and
head circumference, the baby
was
33 or
34 weeks of
gestation, which means the baby
was probably six to seven weeks
early.
T.Vol.II, p.269
Defendant was aware that the
baby was having
"grunting
respirations,•• which he said
was a sign of early respiratory
distress syndrome.
Defendant positioned the baby
in such a way that the labored
breathing was relieved.

Dr. Chan, University of Utah:
Q: Is it possible to adjust
the position of the baby so as
to elimin^le the grunting
sound?
A: Yes. And that's irrelevant
to me because the baby could be
face down and the noised could
be muffled. There's many ways
that we can change the noise
coming out.
That' s not
relevant to me.
Q: Does the changing of the
noise Kchange the exertion of
the br 7?
A: No.
Q: Does it change the progress
of the disease?
A: No.
Q:
Does
it
have
any
physiologic effect whatsoever
11

with regard to the disease?
A: No.
T.Vol.Ill, p.277
He further testified that the
severity of the respiratory
distress did not indicate a
need for hospitalization.
He said that he informed Ivy
that the baby was premature and
had difficulty breathing, but
that the baby was then stable.

Dr. Kramer:
Q:
Now, 'in this particular
case, I think you recognized
that the baby was born at the
home of the Youngs and then
after the birth of the baby was
left at the home of the Youngs
for a time?
A: That's what I was told.
Q: And I understand that you
feel that that is inappropriate
because the baby should have
been placed in the hospital?
That's your conclusion?
A: That's my opinion.
T.Vol.II, pp.289-290

He instructed Ivy to call him
if there was any change and
admitted that he was depending
on Ivy to carefully watch the
infant.

Ivy Young:
A:
He told me to watch the
baby through the night.
Q:
He said watch the baby
through the night?
A: (witness nods)
Q: Anything else?
A: No. He didn't tell me what
to watch for. He just said to
watch the baby.
Q: Did he say anything to you
if
any
problem
arose
or
anything of this sort?
A: No.
Q:
Didn't say, "Call me if
there's a problem."?
A: No.
T.Vol.I, pp.85-86

Before leaving the Young
residence, defendant noted the
respiratory
difficult
had
subsided.
He stated, "The baby was
respiring well, the baby was
still awake and alert and
muscle tone was still good."
He
also
said,
"I
was

Dr. Chan:
A: * A baby who is born at 33,
34
weeks
gestation
at
approximately
four
pounds,
which I think is less than two
kilos, 2,000 grams —
Q: Yes.
A:
—
would certainly be
admitted to a newborn intensive
12

impressed that the baby had
already shown some signs of
respiratory distress syndrome,
but under similar circumstances
in the past, I have left babies
at home, having instructed the
mother on how to nurse, having
instructed the mother to keep
the baby warm and therefore I
felt I could leave, confident
that grandma would call me,
confident that if there were
any progression of symptoms
that I would be called.
Defendant
later testified
that of 300 home births he had
attended, approximately ten of
those
babies
had
been
premature.
Eight
of
those
had
no
respiratory
distress,
but
defendant said that he had
hospitalized only three of
those eight.
In the case of this infant,
defendant testified that "in my
experience and the judgment
that I applied at the time
based on experience with babies
who are even smaller that this
delivered at home, they can in
many cases get along very, very
well ..."

care unit.
That baby is at
high risk for, one, developing
respiratory problems, such as
hyaline
membrane
disease;
second, metabolic problems like
low sugar; electrolyte problems
and also anemia or infection.
T.Vol.Ill, pp.239-240
Ivy Young:
Q: All right. Now, at that
time (just as the Dr. left) did
you note the breathing?
A: It still stayed the same.
It was the same noise then the
baby would quit the noise and
kind of rest for awhile.
Q:
So what you heard was a
grunting sound and then it
seemed like it would rest for
awhile?
A: Yes.
Q: Could you detect in those
rest periods whether or not the
baby was breathing?
A: He seemed to be. It was
just kind of a very short
period.
Each time I checked
that he was okay and I turned
him to the other side and then
he'd start grunting again.
Q:
How often would he make
this grunting sound?
A:
He was just making the
grunting sound all the ^xme.
T.Vol.I, p.88
Dr.
Kramer,
State's
Pediatrician:
A:
I'm not sure whether Dr.
Warden had the confidence of
the parents to watch this baby.
I'm not sure what happened, but
I believe, if I can explain
this, I believe that parents or
grandparents are ~ot in the
position to evaluate a baby's
situation where the baby is, in
my opinion, premature.
T.Vol.II, p.293

The State's expert medical
witness testified that although
the mother and baby "would do
better"
in
a
hospital,
defendant's evaluation of the
infant's
well
being
would
indicate that the baby's vital
signs were "acceptable".

Dr. Chan:
Q: Would the high Apgar score
to you indicate that it is not
a high risk baby?
A: No.
Q: Would that baby still be,
in your opinion, a high risk
baby?
A: Yes.
T.Vol.Ill, p.255
Dr. Kramer:
Q:
My previous question was
couched in terms of otherwise
healthy.
Changing
that
hypothetical just somewhat to
say that the child had those
same physical dimensions but
had an acceptable eight, nine,
or ten Apgar score, would that
child be considered a healthy
child?
A: No.
T.Vol.II, p.278,279

They conceded that the infant
may have survived had he been
hospitalized up to ten hours
after birth, but believed that
leaving the baby at home was
"bad judgment" on defendant's
part.
The State's
neonatologist
testified that hyaline membrane
disease
is
a
progressive
disease.
He also indicated that a baby
in
the
condition
of
the
deceased is typically "at high
risk for medical and surgical
problems."
As far as mortality for an
infant
with
the
disease,
however, he stated that the
failure to provide therapy
would
only
place
the
probability of death at five to
fifteen percent.
He later stated upon cross
examination that statistically
only two percent of babies die

Dr. Kramer:
Q:
Can you comment on the
probability of saving the child
at 8 o'clock?
A: I don't know, the earlier
the better.
T.Vol.II, pp.307-308
Dr. Chan:
Q: . With that scenario where
the baby was about four pounds,
33 to 34 weeks in gestation,
about ten hours old, blue and
with a lowered heart rate and
respiration, frould you expect
to be able to save the baby?
A:
I would hope so, but I
would have my doubts.
T.Vol.Ill, p.247
Dr. Chan:
Q:
How much
would
the
probability of life for that
child be decreased by the
failure to provide therapy?
A: Failure to provide therapy
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from untreated hyaline membrane
disease.
He further said, "I guess the
message is it's very unusual
and rare to lose a baby at this
gestation and this birth weight
from hyaline membrane disease."
Asked whether it would be
outside the medical standard of
care to have the family of a
home-delivered
newborn
to
monitor any changes in the
baby's
condition,
the
neonatologist believed it was,
but
conceded
that
other
competent
physicians
would
disagree with him.

for a baby at 33, 34 weeks
gestation who has developed
hyaline membrane disease, I
think you extent of mortality,
instead
of
less than one
percent, you move into five,
ten, fifteen percent.
T.Vol.Ill, p.250

The State's expert testified
that the medical community in
this state does not teach or
train
physicians
for
home
delivery
and
generally
recommends against it.

Dr. Chan:
A:
That's to me a naive
approach to the problem because
it does occur and I think home
deliveries are appropriate in
many circumstances.
T.Vol.Ill, p.266

The court misapprehended

the statement of the witness

regarding the "statistic" that only two percent of babies die of
untreated hyaline membrane disease.
Qs Untreated could be in the hospital or it
could be —> it doesn't matter where it is, I
suggest. The bottom line is that the child is
untreated; therefore, if you have hyaline
membrane, 33 to 34 weeks and it's untreated, 2
percent, two out of a hundred may die?
A: We're not talking apples and oranges. If
the baby is in the hospital and it's — see,
there's no study where you say this baby will be
treated and this baby will not be treated. I'm
giving you the statistics of all babies in the
hospital being watched and there's some babies you
watch carefully and they don't need any treatment,
don't require any treatment, and those babies —
and if you say yes, if you're looking at those
babies that are not treated, very few of them will
die* (T.Vol.Ill, p.260)
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It would be both unethical and inhumane to do a study in
a hospital in which patients exhibiting symptoms requiring therapy
are divided into two groups:
which will not.

one which will be treated and one

The statistics quoted by the witness were for

patients who were not treated for the reason that in the opinion of
their

physicians,

therapy

was

not

required.

Under

those

circumstances, very few will die.
Further, on re-direct, the witness clarified his position:
Q: Now, we've had some talk about percentages and
it's a little bit confusing, so I just want to
recap a bit.
From the point of view of the
doctor, leaving the home 30 minutes after the
birth of the baby, given the factors that the baby
is 33 to 34 weeks in gestation, that it's four
pounds, that it's got some blueness in it's
extremities and that it's making the grunting
sounds, what can you say about that baby?
A. That baby had respiratory distress syndrome.
That baby is having respiratory problems. That
baby is sick.
Q:
All right. Now, do you say anything with
regard to the probability of it's dying from that
disease if it's untreated or left in the care of
a layperson?
A: I think to leave a baby with hyaline membrane
disease with a layperson just creates increased
problems of mortality for that baby, morbidity.
Q: Can you give us any kind of a quantitative
objective basis that we can develop as to what the
degree of risk there is for that baby left in the
care of a layperson?
A: It is very high. You could say 10, 20, - 20
times higher when left to a layperson to manage
the baby.
T.Vol.Ill, pp.278-279
In any event, the determination of criminal negligence
should not be established by percentages of morbidity.
determined
standard.

by a subjective

standard

rather than an objective

State v. Ruben, 663 P.2d 445 (Utah 1983).
16

It is to be

POINT II.
THE RULING OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS IS IN
CONFLICT WITH RULINGS OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT IN
THAT THE COURT LOOKED BEYOND THE EVIDENCE MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE JURY VERDICT.
Again, reviewing the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals,
the court cites evidence favorable to the defendant.

The Utah

Supreme Court has consistently ruled that the standard for review
of a jury verdict is to look at the evidence favorable to the jury
verdict to test it's sufficiency.
In reviewing the conviction, we do not substitute
our judgment for that of the jury. "It is the
exclusive function of the jury to weigh the
evidence and to determine the credibility of the
witnesses..." State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 231
(Utah 1980); accord State v. Linden, 657 P.2d
1364, 1366 (Utah 1983).
So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences from which findings of all
the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably
be made, our inquiry stops. State v. Booker, 709
P. 2d 342 at 345 (Utah 1985). See also State v.
Gardner, 101 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 10 (Utah 1989),
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 607 (Utah 1985).
The original Utah Court of Appeals' opinion published in
the Utah Advance Reports indicated that it failed to adhere to that
standard in the instant case:
Thus, reasonable minds could examine the evidence
presented and entertain a vreasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted'. Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, at 45.
(emphasis added)
That statement is clearly not the standard established by
the cases cited. Under the established standard, the court should
only overturn the conviction if "...reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
17

crime of which he was convicted."

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,

444 (Utah 1983).
The Court of Appeals apparently amended its opinion prior
to publication

in the official report, correctly stating the

standard:
Thus, in examining the evidence presented,
responsible minds must have entertained a
Reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.' Warden, 784 P. 2d
1204, at 1209
(emphasis added)
The court further misapplied the standard of review in it's
assessment of the evidence.

In its original opinion, the Court of

Appeals wrote:
This response merely reinforces our conclusion
that his testimony, as well as that of the other
experts for the State, must be construed in light
of the fact that home delivery, though legal, is
not a widespread practice by doctors in Utah.
Warden, 122 Utah Adv.Rep. 42, at 45.
(emphasis added)
That sentence was omitted in the official report (Warden,
784 P.2d, at 1209).

The omission of the court's rationale does not

change the fact that there was expert testimony that the actions of
the defendant were outside the standard of care.

The jury must be

at liberty to decide the issue of criminal negligence.
In coming to the conclusion that a jury must have a
reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals has mandated that the
State's expert testimony be given less weight than th° testimony of
the defendant's witnesses.
The jury was aware that home delivery is not taught as a
practice in the Utah medical community, but that the standard of
18

care and treatment would be the same in the home as if in a
hospital setting.

Although some of the experts admitted they

discouraged homebirth as a practice, Dr. Chan clarified that to
discourage

homebirth

is

a naive

approach

and

that

you

must

recognize that homebirths do occur and are appropriate in many
circumstances (T.Vol.Ill, p.266).
By concluding that the medical experts testimony must be
viewed critically, the court has removed from the jury the function
of assessing the weight of the evidence.
To establish criminal negligence, it is necessary
to show conduct which is %a gross deviation from
the standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.' ...It is therefore a
subjective element requiring consideration of all
relevant circumstances surrounding the incident.
State v. Ruben, supra.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in State v. Bolsinqer,
699 Po2d 1214 (Utah 1985), that a jury could take into account
several factor in evaluating conduct:
In Neitzel, supra, the court enumerated four
determining factors a jury should be asked when it
evaluates conduct resulting in death and alleged
to be depraved indifferences (1) the utility of
the defendant's conduct, (2) the magnitude of the
risk, (3) the defendant's knowledge of the risk,
(4) any precautions taken by the defendant to
minimize the risk. Bolsinqer at 1220, referring
to Neitzel v. State, 655 P. 2d 325 (Alaska App.
1982)
The jury was entitled to assess each of the above factors
in relation to this case to determine whether the defendant was
criminally negligent.

The court should not reverse the jury's

conclusions unless it finds there is no evidence to support those
19

conclusions.
1.

THE UTILITY OF DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT.

It is undisputed

that the family requested a home delivery and that there is some
social utility to the practice of home birth. The question is what
social utility was there in leaving Jareth Young in his diseased
condition to the care of Ivy Young, an inexperienced layperson.
The jury was entitled to accept the testimony of Ivy Young that the
defendant left her with no instructions as to what to watch for and
that Ivy Young asked the defendant if the victim ought not be
hospitalized. The jury is further entitled to question the utility
of the defendant's failure to diligently attend his patients before
and after delivery.
The jury should further be able to assess the social
utility of practicing home birth medicine while not maintaining
malpractice insurance and not being authorized to admit patients
into a hospital or treat patients in a hospital setting.
2.

MAGNITUDE OF THE RISK.

The magnitude of the risk can

best be assessed by determining the amount th^c the risk of death
is increased by defendant's decision to leave the victim in the
care of the grandmother, Ivy Young.

Dr. Chan testified that so

doing increased the probability of death ten to twenty times.
'The single most important factor in determining the nature
and magnitude of the risk is the fact that Hyaline Membrane Disease
is a progressive disease.

That is, given all infants of this

gestational age who contract the disease, five to fifteen percent
can

be

expected

to

die

without
20

medical

intervention.

The

probability of death increases as the disease progresses.

The

experts agreed that as medical intervention became necessary, time
became an increasingly important factor.
3.

THE DEFENDANT'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE RISK.

acknowledged

on the witness

Defendant

stand that he had diagnosed

the

disease, that he was aware that it was progressive in nature and
that it was potentially fatal (T.Vol.IV, p.176).

He had even made

the determination that the baby would be better off in the hospital
(T.Vol.IV, p.174).

Sharon Johnson asked the defendant if the child

shouldn't be hospitalized but he told her it would not be necessary
(T.Vol.IV, p.126).
4.

PRECAUTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEFENDANT TO MINIMIZE THE

RISK. Emphasis has been placed by both the State and the defendant
upon

the

decision

to

leave

the

victim

in

the

care

of

the

grandmother, a layperson. That act alone, however, is not the only
act

for

which

the

defendant

should

be

held

accountable.

Consideration should be given to the immediate prenatal care or
lack thereof, and the total absence of a reasonable course of
follow-up care after the birth.

The jury instruction given by the

trial court stated:
The standard of care to be applied in this
case is that which is applicable to a physician
practicing general medicine in connection with the
pregnancy, labor, delivery, and aftercare of a
mother and newborn infant in the circumstances of
this case. (R. at page 53)
The defendant failed to minimize the risks that existed
early in the day prior to delivery.

He failed to minimize the

risks at the time of delivery and then after diagnosing the disease
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he failed to minimize the risks as the disease progressed.
Instead, the defendant made the conscious decision not to minimize
the risk of death by turning care of the infant over to specialists
in a hospital setting.

Had he done so, the probability of death

was less than 1%.
POINT III.
THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW A SUBSTANTIAL
AND UNJUSTIFIABLE RISK OF DEATH BY VIEWING THE
EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
VERDICT.
[A]

Marshalling the evidence favorable to the verdict

reveals that there was sufficient evidence to support the verdict.
The standard of review that should have been applied by the
Utah Court of Appeals is enunciated in State v. BMG Corporation,
700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985):
To mount a successful attack on the trial
court's findings of fact, an appellant must
marshall all the evidence in support of the trial
court's findings and then demonstrate that even
viewing it in the light most favorable to the
court below, the evidence is insufficient to
support the findings. BMG Corporation, at 1070.
Marshalling the evidence in this case in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict, the following inferences can be
drawn:
1. Defendant was a licensed physician who had maintained
a family practice since 1968, including obstetrical care (T.Vol.IV,
pp.39-48);
2.

Defendant assumed responsibility for the infant's

physical well-being by agreeing to deliver it at home;
3. Defendant did not insists on examining the mother when
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she reported vaginal bleeding to determine if premature birth was
likely;
4.

Defendant knew that the established due date was

several weeks off, yet he failed to personally attend the patient,
a fact the defendant admitted on the witness stand was an error in
judgment (T.Vol.IV. pp.153, 163);
5. Defendant knew that the local practice was not to have
babies delivered at the local hospital if the gestation period is
less than 35 weeks, but rather to deliver in a more specialized
hospital (T.Vol.II, p.281);
6.

Defendant could have minimized the risk of premature

birth by Tocolysis (T.Vol.Ill, p.179);
7.

The practice of referring a mother in premature labor

to a hospital for Tocolysis is within the standard of care for
physicians practicing home births and for this doctor personally
(T.Vol.IV, p.131);
8.

Defendant could have slowed the onset of labor by

methods available in a homebirth setting (T.Vol.IV, p.131);
9.

Defendant could then have had the baby delivered in a

hospital setting, as would have been his own normal practice even
under these conditions, since he would not normally deliver a
premature baby in a home (T.Vol.IV, p.149);
10.

Defendant diagnosed the infant after birth as having

Respiratory Distress Syndrome and had actual knowledge of the risk
of death posed by the disease, that it was progressive in nature,
the techniques available for monitoring the progress of the disease
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by electronic equipment, and the treatments available in Class III
hospital neonatal units (T.Vol.IV, pp.175-178);
11.

Defendant could have immediately hospitalized the

baby, but did not;
12.

Defendant could have remained longer in the home

himself, but did not;
13.

Defendant could have arranged for a nurse or other

trained professional to monitor the progress of the disease, but
did not;
14.
specific

Defendant

list

of

could have provided

symptoms

with

an

Ivy Young with a

objective

standard

for

observation, but did not;
15.

Defendant could have provided

Ivy Young with a

protocol for action more thorough than to just call him;
16.

Defendant advised the family to position the baby in

a way which relieved the symptoms but would not alleviate the
condition itself, but would rather mask the indicators of the
progress of the disease;
17.

Defendant minimized the seriousness of the infant's

condition to both Sharon and Ivy, and never advised anyone that the
child could die from the disease (T.Vol.IV, p.132);
18.

The practice of hospitalizing an infant with the

disease was within the standards of the defendant's practice and,
indeed,

he

had

hospitalized

three

of

eight

children

he

had

delivered at home with the disease (T.Vol.IV. p.132);
19.

The defendant was not authorized to hospitalize this
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infant because he had no malpractice insurance, so would have to
call another physician or have the infant admitted through an
emergency room facility, which would cause him some embarrassment
(T.Vol.IV, pp.121-122,124,126,127)
20. Defendant left the infant in the care of a layperson,
the grandmother, with instructions only to watch the infant through
the night, without any specific instructions as to what to watch
for (T.Vol.I, p.86);
21. Defendant consistently, from the early stages of labor
through the time he left the child, assured the family that the
conditions

they

were

concerned

about

were

normal,

that

hospitalization was unnecessary, and that Ivy should "stop fussing"
(T.Vol.I, p.66; Vol.Ill, p. 93,94,102);
22o
that

the

Defendant knew that the disease was progressive and

probability

of

survival

decreased

as

the disease

progressed, yet he failed to call on the Youngs until noon the next
day (T.Vol.IV, p.Ill);
23.

The defendant lives less than five blocks from the

Young residence (T.Vol.IV, p.162).

His office is six to eight

blocks from the Young residence (T.Vol.IV, p. 158).

He had ample

opportunity to visit or call upon the Youngs, but did not;
24.

At approximately 6h hours after the birth, the

defendant was awake, reading National Geographic (T.Vol.IV, p.105);
25.

Defendant remained at home for some time before

leaving to play racquetball at a club which did not open until 8%
hours after the birth (T.Vol.IV, p.105);
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26.

Had the defendant called on the Youngs at that time,

he would have learned that Jareth was continuing in the grunting
sounds* and had an abnormal color (T.Vol.I, p.91);
27.

Defendant returned from racquetball to his office

approximately ten hours after the birth (T.Vol.IV, p.107).

Had he

checked with the Youngs at that time, the defendant would have
learned that the baby had, at one time, stopped breathing (T.Vol.I,
p.94) and that Ivy Young was trying to contact him;
28.

A layperson could not be expected to recognize the

subtle changes in the progress of the disease (T.Vol.Ill, pp.
272,273);
29.

Jareth Young died from Respiratory Distress Syndrome

(T.Vol.Ill, p.13);
30.

By leaving the child in the care of laypersons, the

risk of death increased 10 to 20 times —

from less than one

percent to up to fifteen percent (T.Vol.Ill, pp.278,279); and
31.
a

The death was preventable by hospitalization within

99% degree of

certainty, a fact known to the defendant

(T.Vol.Ill, p.248)1
These inferences are sufficient to sustain the verdict of
the jury.
[B]
jurisdictions

The

facts

support

the

of

cases

both

conclusion

in

that

Utah
the

and

other

evidence was

sufficient to convict the defendant.
The Utah Supreme Court has found the evidence sufficient
to sustain a finding of criminal negligence in death. cases
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involving less probability of death. In State v. Hallet, 619 P*2d
335 (Utah 1980), the court found sufficient evidence to sustain a
conviction of negligent homicide v/here the defendant, acting as an
accomplice, bent down a stop sign so it was not visible from the
lane of travel.

In State v. McPhee, 684 P.2d 57 (Utah 1984), the

evidence in an automobile homicide consisted of evidence of
drinking, a state of intoxication so as to cause staggering and
slurred speech and evidence of crossing three lanes of travel into
the wrong lane of an intersecting street.
In these two cases the defendants acted with negligence
with regard to unknown but foreseeable victims. The risk of death
was contingent upon a victim appearing upon the scene.

In this

case, there was an actual known victim and a peril of death that
was known to the defendant and not contingent upon the arrival of
a victim.

The actuarial probability

of death, given that

contingency, must be less in those cases than the probability of
death in the instant case.
The Court cites caselaw dealing with "bad judgment" by a
physician. State v. Warden, 122 Utah Adv. Rep 42, at 45. The case
now before this Court is factually more consistent with the Montana
case of State v. Hoffman, 639 P. 2d 567 (Montana 1982), where a
mother was found guilty of negligent homicide for failure to
provide medical treatment for her son.

Other neighboring states

have had similar results. In State v. Rupp, 586 P.2d 1302 (Ariz.
App. 1978) a involuntary manslaughter charge was upheld for parents
whose infant child died of starvation based upon failure to feed
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the child and based upon failure to provide medical attention.
Also, in Walker v. Superior Court (People), 763 P.2d 852 (Cal.
1988), the California Supreme Court ruled that a parent who
provided only "prayer treatment" to a gravely ill child was guilty
of felony child endangerment. In Funkhouser v. Oklahoma, 763 P. 2d
695 (Okla. Cr. 1988), the State properly charged parents who did
not seek medical aid for their three-month-old son, who died from
complications arising from pneumonia, with manslaughter in the
second degree.

Also, in State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash.

App. 1971) a violation of parental duty to furnish medical care to
minor dependant child, with other elements of manslaughter being
present, was sufficient basis on which to support a conviction for
crime of manslaughter.
The subject of failure to provide medical treatment is
dealt with in Homicide—Lack of Medical Attention, 100 A.L.R.2d 483
(1965).
Where the defendant in this case was neither qualified nor
authorized to provide the treatment which would have saved this
infant's life, his duty more closely resembles that of a parent or
other person with a contractual duty of care, than that of a
physician fully qualified and authorized to treat.
There

is

no

exception

from

liability

for

criminal

negligence for physicians. The fact that defendant is a physician
is one of the many circumstances the jury is allowed to put in
balance in determining the issue of criminal negligence. In People
v. Phillips, 414 P.2d 353 (Cal. 1966), a doctor of chiropractic was
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convicted of second degree murder where he represented he could
cure a cancer patient without surgery and caused decedent's parents
to remove decedent from the hospital. The California Supreme Court
reversed the conviction based on a jury instruction on the felony
murder rule. In reversing the conviction, however, the court ruled
that in order to establish a homicide, evidence would have to show
that the operation would have prolonged the patient's life. If the
defendant's culpable act has significantly decreased the span of
decedent's life, the law will not hear defendant's say that the
victim would thereafter have died in any event.
The Phillips case is similar to the instant case in that
the defendant advised the parents that hospitalization was not
necessary and that positioning the baby to relive the grunting
would cure the problem.

Dr. Chan testified that had the baby been

hospitalized, the child would have survived within a 99% degree of
certainty.
Defendant's act was not a mere error in judgment. When the
family

suggested

hospitalization, the defendant prescribed

an

alternative treatment which expert testimony showed was ineffective
in curing the disease and instead masked the symptoms of the
disease.
While the statement that the State's experts testimony
"must be construed in light of the fact that the home-delivery,
though legal, is not a widespread practice by doctors in Utah"
(Adv. Rep. at 45) has been extracted, the official report opinion
continues to note that "the medical community in this state does
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not teach or train physicians for home delivery and generally we
recommend against it." Warden, 784 P.2d 1204, at 1209.

The

question of popularity of home delivery as a practice may be
considered by the jury, but is not a proper question for review by
an appellate court.
In State v. Maxfield, 677 P.2d 519 (Idaho App. 1984) a
naturalpathic physician was convicted of involuntary manslaughter
after a death caused by a "colonic irrigation" which consisted of
a series of tap water enemas to relieve the victim's sever
constipation.
Naturalpathic or Homeopathic medicine, prayer remedies, or
chiropractic medicine are not taught or practiced in medical
schools.

Homebirth is not taught in Utah medical schools.

The

fact that these treatments are unusual or unpopular in the medical
community does not disqualify a medical doctor as a witness. Such
factors are proper issues to be weighed by the jury. The jury may
consider those factor not only to determine the nature of the risk
and the efforts by the defendant to minimize the risk, but also to
assess the credibility of the expert witnesses. Once the jury has
weighed those factors and rendered a verdict, the appellate courts
should not disturb the verdict. See Booker, supra, at 345.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this court should find
that the Court of Appeals misapplied the standard of review for
this case and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /*./ /day of August, 1990.
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136 South Main
Salt Lake City UT 84101
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ADDENDUM
A. Court of Appeals Opinion:
Adv. Rep. 42 (Ut App 1989)

State v. Warden, 122 Utah

B. Official Opinion: State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 (Utah
App 1989)
C.
Rehearing

Court of Appeals Order denying State's Petition for

D.

Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1974)

E.

Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1973)

F.

Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 et sea. (1953, as amended)
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A. Court of Appeals Opinion: State v. Warden. 122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42 (Ut
App 1989)

42

State T. Warden

COO« • CO

evaluated her for home delivery, considering
the risks of her pregnancy, the proximity of
hospital facilities, and the availability of
family support to care for the infant and
mother after birth. Defendant determined that
Joanne's pregnancy was low risk and that
medical facilities were nearby. He also learned
that Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the
primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy had
given birth at home to four of her seven children. Based on -this evaluation, defendant
decided that Joanne was a suitable candidate
for home delivery and agreed to attend the
Gteat
'birth. He also made arrangements to obtain
122 Utah Adv. Rep. 42
Joanne's medical records from her previous
doctor, and on the basis of that information
IN T H E
and his own examination, calculated her deliUTAH COURT OF APPEALS
very date to be in early December.
On the morning of November 7, Joanne
STATE of Utah,
began experiencing vaginal Weeding. Ivy caBed
Plaintiff and Respondeat,
defendant, who was in Salt Lake City at the
••
time. Defendant expressed concern that labor
David R. WARDEN, Jr., MJ).,
was beginning and advised Ivy to confine
Defeadaat and Appellant
Joanne to bed and to contact him immediately
if the bleeding became heavier or if strong
No.tt*S7S-GA
contractions began. That afternoon. Ivy caBed
FILED: November 22,1M9
defendant again and told him that the WeedBnsf
had stopped. She also told him that the ha*
Second Circuit, Layton Depaitmeot
spoken with the father of the cfafld and that fat
Honorable K. Roger Bean
had told her that conception had occurred >
month earfier than originally befieved. Defe.
ATTOjUfffYS: ' w
ndant testified that this information led him tfe
Darwin C. Hansen* Bountiful, for AppeBant
think that the labor waa not premature, and
MeMa C. Wilson, and Brian J. Namba,
he advised her to call again aa labor.conti**
rarmingidft, for Respondent
nuesL Ivy did id that evening, repeating that
Joanne was having occasional coutractioM£*
Before Judge* Bench, Greenwood, and
Defendant toid her to caB back when tfc*
Buflock.1
contractions were three to five minutes apart.
At about 10:15 pan., Ivy informed defendant
OPINION
that the final stage of labor had begun. De£>
BENCH, JadsjK
endant arrived $t the house fifteen minatee
**-**-.
Defendant appeals bis jury conviction of later.
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech berth
negligent homicide, a dast A misdemeanor, In
violation dt Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 to a male infant which appeared to be heasthy»
but weighed only an estimated four to £t*e
(197S), ^ e reverse the conviction.
pounds. The baby exhibited some respirator*
FACTS
distress which defendant attributed to prems>
Defendant David R / Warden* Jr., is a Bee- turity. Defendant testified that he suggested
nsed and board-certified physician who hospitalization of the Infant to Ivy, but that
began practicing family medBdna in KayiviDe, Ivy was concerned because there was no health
Utah, te 1961 As part of his practice, defen- insurance to cover those expense*. (Ivy denied
dant provide* obstetrical care, and ftrtmatin that she ever discussed with defendant,
that ha has attended approximately 2500 taxation of the infant.) Defendant
births, 300 of which have been home defire- Ivy how to position the infant to refleye ^ _ ^
rstJ. •*- '***
>+
'
of the respiratory distress and showed Joawf
In September 19$6, defendant wag visited far how to mine the baby. He also instu «*f Ivy
bit office by Joanne Young, who consulted tp keep the chfld warm fpd to monitor tfc|
defendant because she was pregnant out-of- baby's temperature, color, and brathtafe
wedlock and wanted to have her baby at After Instructing Ivy to cafl him if theft wjrt
home. Joanne testified that she was embarrtv any changes in the baby's condition, defeat
ued about her pregnancy and 'didn't want to daat left at about 11;S0 p.au
have to t o to the hospital and have people
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and dag
know/ She also expressed a desire to keep the baby into a warmer room. Ivy noticed that J^a
expenses of birth to a minimum. Defendant child's hands and tM were 'very bhie,* bat
did not caB defendant. At 1:00 a.m., the baby
case, however, we believe the issue of prejudice
relative to the gun custody issue was sufficiently
problematic to merit analysis.
a. For example, defendant claims his counsel should
have argued he was incompetent to stand trial or
lacked the capacity (o form the requisite intent to
commit the crimes. Testimony at defendant's sentencing hearing, however, by Dr. Alma Carlisle, a
Utah State Prison psychologist, negated those theories. Exclusion of the theories was, therefore, a
legitimate trial strategy.
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appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy attempted to resuscitate him for about twenty
minutes, and apparently Use infant responded.
She thai called defendant's office, but was
told he was at home. When Ivy called defendant's home, his wife advised her he was not
there, but would be in his office by 9:30 a.m.
In nether call did she identify herself, leave a
message, nor report that there was any emergency. She apparently was aware defendant
was not inaccessible in such a situation, but
did- not make further attempts to reach him.
She did not take the infant to the hospital or
notify emergency services. She testified that m
England, her native home, 'you would have
had to have a- doctor's permission to have
called an ambulance. *
At about 8:30 ajn., Ivy called a friend but
did not tell her that the child was having difficulty breathing. She also called her clergyman, but did not advise him until 9:30 or
10:00 a.m. that the baby was having respiratory difficulty. The clergyman called a local
pediatrician, who arrived at the Youngs' home
at about 10:30 turn, only to find the infant
'lifeless.' The baby was taken to a hospital,
but was pronounced dead shortly after arrival.
A postmortem examination revealed that the
infant was been approximately six to seven
weds premature and had died from respiratory distress caused by prematurity of the
tangs (hyaline membrane disease). Defendant
subsequently was charged with one count of
negfigentbomldde.
An Initial jury trial ended In a mistrial prior
to the rendition of a verdict* A second Jury
trial was hdd February 22-26, 198S, and
defendant was convicted u charged. Defendant/! motions to arrest judgment and for a
new trial were denied*

(14th ed. 1979). Furthermore, "[t]heriskmust
be of such a nature and degree that the failure
to perceive it constitutes a grots deviation
from the tuodard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in aU the circumstances
as viewed from the actor's standpoint.9 Utah
Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1978). Consequently, negligent homicide involves a defendant's perception of risk and necessarily requires an evaluation of his or her state of mind.
Stale r. Wcsscadorf, Til ?Jd 523, 525-26
(Utah O. App. 1989). Whether a defendant
negligently fails to perceive the risk is a question of fact for the jury. See State v. Howard,
597 PJd 878, 881^Utah 1979). However, the
risk of death 'must be of such a degree that
an ordinary person would not... fail to recognize it* State v. Dyer, 671 PJd 142, 14*
(Utah 1983).
-w,^
Because the 'failure to perceive the risfc
constitutes a frost deviation from the reasonable man standard,' ordinary nrgflgeace
adequate in the civil law is insufficient J©
constitute criminal negligence. Stat* r+
Cham, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah 197% * *
abo SUDdiford, 769 PJd at 267; 2 CTorch,.
Wharton's Criminal Law §168 (terms sud» aa
'criminal negligence* are intended toconao*
deviations from reasonableness
greater hi degree than ordinary
Thus, 'teiese inattfntkm or mistakg^in jfidfe*
meal resulting even in death of iuother&j|qi
criminal unless the quality of the act j
s o / Pcopk r. Rodrifoez* 186
4»,8CaL Rptr. 863,868(1960% ^x y m

KXPiarrTOTiMONiru^ J^-

Defendant contends that expert testimony;
was required in this case to establish'or
'standard of care,' but that the'State's
medkal experts were not qualified to testify
ISSLrfS
On the other hand, the Stats argues Out
Defendant' raises essentially two issues on expert iftnfHcai testimony was not icquirejL
appeal, arguing, for a reversal of his convic- and that it needed only to present coiuiKwiif
tion* He first claims that the State's expert evidence to show the nature and degree oTjist
witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the and the circumstances as viewed from"tfce
applicable?medical standard of care. Second, actor's standpoint.' The State correctly obshe argues that there was insufficient evidence erve* that the 'standard of care" in section 7*
to establish that his conduct deviated signifi- )-103(4) refers to the actor's mental etitfe; fc»
cantly from the applicable standard of c m opposed to medical malpractice cases in whicil
and thai there was a causal connection
expert meuicai testimony is reqiureu\io snow
between his conduct and the baby's death.
the appBcabk standard of mea^,c^0SJ*&
%
e^.r, CbMdwkk r. NWm, 763 P.2d I t f ; f c f
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWOU
Conduct instituting the crime of «*gfff*rf (Utah CL App. 1988). It is tfco tn* flu*
homicide occurs when an 'actor, acting with expert testimony if not required to prov$ t£Si
criminal negligence, causes the death of mental state of a criminal defendant accusei
another.* Utah Code Ann. $76-5-206(1) of Homicide. See SO* v. Aoctafaa ttS 9M
* * *!***>
(1978). Hie culpable mental state for criminal «,Sl(Ptahl97D.
We" conclude, however, thai expert § * £
negligence requires 'only that a defendant
'ought to be aware of a substantial and unj- mooy wis required in this case since sues
ustifiable risk* of death/ State r. Suodiford, testimony was necessary to estabfish die nature
769 P.2d 254, 267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah and degree of risk. Section 76-5-206(1)
Code Ann. 976-2-103(4) (197*)); see also 2 requires the State to prove beyond treasonC Torda, Wharton's Criminal Law §168 able doubt that defendant's judgment j*as
criminally deficient because he failed to per©*
UTAH ADVANCE U P O « S
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dve t substantial ntk that death could occur.
Without an understanding of the nature and
degree of risk, the jury could not determine
whether the nsk was substantial, and if so,
whether defendant's failure to perceive it was
grossly negligent. Unless the risk is one within
the common knowledge and experience of
laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury could
make an informed determination of culpability.* We believe that expert testimony is required where criminal negligence is alleged and
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the
ken of the average layperson. See, e.g.,
Ketcbum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp. 934
(W.D.N.Y. 1976) (State'* use of expert
medical testimony at trial supplied sufficient
evidence of criminal negligence for negligent
homicide conviction in* death of mother on
whom physician had performed legal abortion).
Defendant argue* that the State's expert
medical witnesses did not qualify as experts
because they do not attend home deliveries.
The witnesses included two obstetrician/
gynecologists, a pediatrician, and a neonatologist. Citing the medical malpractice case of
Burton v. Youngbhod, 711 P.2d 245, 24*
(Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school o(
medicine is not competent to testify as an
expert against the practitioner of another
school), defendant argues that the State's
doctors were not qualified to testily because
they were of a different school of medicine
v
than defendant*
v
* x~
The qualification of i n expert witness ia a
matter within the sound discretion of the trial
couru State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d 420, 421
(Utah 1986). There was evidence in the record
that there is no board certification or recognized medical specialty in home delivery. There
was also evidence that the medical principle*
applicable to the delivery of babies are appflcable whether a birth occurs at home or in a
hospital. In view of the record evidence, the
trial court was within its discretion to qualify
the State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf.
Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 Of methods and
procedures of general plastic surgeon were
shown to be identical to those of spedaHzed
plastic surgeon, one may testify against the
other); Wesael v. Erkkson landscaping Cx+
711 PJd 250, 253 (Utah 1985) {nothing precludes testimony from expert In another trade If
the standard ia the same for. both). "Hie critical factor in determining the competency of
an expert ii whether that expert has knowledge
that can assist the trier of fact in resolving- the
issues before i t ' Id. at 253; see aZw OtahR.
Bvid. 702. We conclude that the trjal court
committed no abuse of discretion in allowing
the State's experts to testify.
v
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Defendant claims that the evidence presented was Insufficient to establish guilt beyond

a reasonable doubt. To convict a person of
violating section 76-5-206(1), the State must
establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, both
prohibited conduct and a culpable mental
state. To establish a culpable mental state, the
prosecution must present evidence that defendant was unaware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, but should have been
so aware.
We review defendant's daim under a standard that does not permit us to substitute our
judgment for that of the jury in a criminal
trial. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424
(Utah CL App. 1989). Rather,
we review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the tight most
favorable to the verdict of the jury.
We reverse a jury convkrion for
insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, ia sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must
have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.
State r. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
1985) (quoting State r. Pctree, 659 P.2d 443,
444 (Utah 1983)); * * a t e
Statev.Hopktm,
119 Utah Adv. Rep. 59,60(1989*. ^ ^ i ^ J
Defendant testified at trial" Oaf W * » * ,
parents weighed the newborn c*by *nd determined it to be about the p o u ^ . D e f c o d * a t
also said he believed the baby
torK^wo>
three weeks premature. Defendanttarawar*
that the baby was having 'gntptfef respirations,* which he said was a sign of early resp-;
iratory dktreta syndrome. Defendant positioned the baby in such a way that Jbe labored
breathing was relieved. He further testified
that the severity of die respiratory <fistre» did
not indicate a need tcz Hospitalization. Ha
said that he Informed Ivy that the baby waa
premature and had difficulty ia breathing, hue
that the baby was then stable. He inatructad
Ivy to call him if there was any change and
admitted that he was depending o * b y to
carefully watch the infant. Before leaving the
Young residence, defendant noted that Jj»
respiratory difficulty had subsided, H* staffed*
'The baby was respiring wed, tbr baby wa*
ttffl awake and akrt and motcfe torn jmj&i *
g o o d / He also said,"
- ' r 5 ^ *~
Zl was impressed that the 0 ^ * K ^ / ^
already stw^n soma s l g n a ^ i c W f c ^
, ^*»tory distress s y n d r o m e ^ ^ ^ « » r ^
{,

_ instructed the mother 'o«f
fc^ta
nurse, having instructedTpt mother
fa keep the baby wan%end there*
fore 1 feh I could lee** confident
that grandma would ca&me, conf-
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ident that if there were any progression of symptoms that I would be
called.
Defendant later testified that of 300 home
births he had attended, approximately ten of
those babies had been premature. Eight of
those had had respiratory distress, but defendant said that he had hospitalized only three
of those eight. In the case of this infant, defendant testified that 'in my experience and the
judgment that I applied at the time based on
experience with babies who are even smaller
than this delivered at home, they can in many
cases get along very, very weU....'
The State's expert medical witnesses testified that although the mother and baby
'would do better' in a hospital, defendant's
evaluation of the infant's well-being would
indicate that the baby's vital signs were
'acceptable." They conceded that the infant
may have survived had he been hospitalized up
to ten hours after birth, but believed that
leaving the baby at home was 'bad judgment'
on defendant's part.*
The State's neonatologist testified that
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive
disease. He also indicated that a baby in the
condition of the deceased is typically 'at high
risk for medical arid surgical'problems.' As
far as mortality for an infant with the disease,,
however, be stated that the failure to provide
therapy would only-plac* the probability of
death at five to- fifteen percent. He later stated
upon cross-examination (ha* statistically only
two percent <x babies die from mttjeeied
hyafine membrane disease. He further said, 1
guess the message U it*s very unusual and rare
to lose a baby et tbh gestation and this birth
weight from hyaline membrane disease. *
Asked whether it would be outside the
medical standard of cfre to have the family of
a home-delivered newborn to monger any
changes in the, baby's concfition, the neonatologist 'believed J* was, but conceded that
other * competent physicians would disagree
with him. This response merely reinforces our
conclusion that his testimony, as wefl * that
of the other experts for the State, must be
construed in light of the fact that home dellvery, though legal, is not a widespread practice by doctors hi Utah. The State's experts
testified that the medical community fii this
state does not teach or train physicians ^for
home delivery Mid generally recommends
A
against it.
/ • * - • •
We are convinced that eves looking at the
evidence in the fight most favorable to the
verdict, that evidence was 'sufficiently inconclusive' to estabfiih that t&ert was a subst*
ndal and unjustifiable risk o f death such that
defendant should have been aware oi it* Thus,
reasonable minds could examine the evidence
presented and entertain *a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of

which he was convicted.' See Booket, 709
P.2dat345.
Since we conclude that the evidence failed to
establish criminal negligence, we need not
reach the issue whether defendant's acts or
omissions were the legal cause of death.
Defendant's conviction is reversed.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
I CONCUR:
J. Robert Bullock, Judge
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judse, ottins
by jpedad appointment pursuant to Utah Code Aim.
{7S-3-24(!0)<$upp.l*9.
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to the
subjective intent of the defendant, Le., 'the actor's
viewpoint,' which need net be accepted by the court
and which is ultimately a determination for the jury.
X Our reMarch has revealed very few cases la which
licensed physicians have been charged with negfigcot
homiode. la many of those cases where feck a
charge has been brought, albeit under differing
statutes, the courts have held that no criminal Saeflity tttaches when death results from aa error of
judgment. See geotnQy Annotation, Homicide
Predicated am Improper Treatment of Dbmm or
Injury.45AXJUd 114(197?).
. - -^ .
,

5

\m

,.

GREENWOOD, Judge: (cofjcurrjng $mi *
I concur in Judge Bench's op&tfdff 46ocerning expert testimony, btxt cfisseat^frbei the
opmton's coodusion that there w W W t u f T idem evidete to wsta&r the ji^rc&rfktktt
of nffflgfw^ lipfFtlffcip.-* Tog majtfnt* opinion
correctly stages the accessary 4»afifhia Of evidence for negligent homicide as befhg where
the defendant should Ti*v* teen aware of a
substantial and unjustified r t t of iSeatfe hot
was not SUte t. Wessakkktjr T77 r\2d 523,
525 (Utah C t App. 1989). Abo, the risk must
be todi that u ordinary penoft would not,
disregard or fail to rccotniat It S$if» rrDyer,
671 P.2d 142, 14S (Hah 190). l W * 3 f t , in
case, the State was 'required to convince
the Jury that there was a subsrarrtiaF said unjustified risk that to l i A o i T * ^
not receive mtrikai e v e In a nospfial-type
setting; (hat defendant was tmaware that the
risk existed; and that an ordinary person in
defendant's position would have jocorirtted
that risk. Off task a**a ijppeSatf ^Sftrfc ***>
determine^ i T t h ^ e v i & t o p f t s t t ^ w W
viewed favorably to thelury ve*tfciT'1Vsufficiently incondusivsr or Inherenfly^iibprobdbt*
that reasonable Grinds must fcav* esfterttneda
reasonable doubt that the defendant eommitted the crime of which hi iras convicted^ 5ttt»
v. B o 0 * e > r « r > - S T ^ t t S , - T 4 5 (Utah
1915) (quoting State v. Petnee, 454 P<2d 443,
444 (19Cty
^w,.
My assessment of t the evidence tapporting
the jury verdkt is as follows: defendant was a
licensed physician who had maintained a
family practice since 1968, including obstetr-
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ical care; defendant assunmri responsibility for
the infant's physical well-beta* by agreeing
122 Utah Adv. Rtp. 4$
to deliver it at home; defendant did not insist
on examining the mother when she reported
IN THE
vaginal bleeding to determine if premature
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
birth was likely or if so, what precautions
should be taken to minimize the likelihood of
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., a Utah
infant after birth *s having Respiratory Dist- corporation,
Plaintiff, Appellant, and Crossress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to
position the infant in a way which relieved the Respondent,
v.
symptoms but would not aOevihte the condition itself; defendant minimizrd the serious- Roland W. RQCHERT,
Defendant, Respondent, and Crossness of the infant's condition to Ivy and
Joanne; three of the ten children he had deli- Appeuant*
vered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome
were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant No. S30244-CA
could die from the disease and that the disease FILED: November 24,19*9
was progressive; defendant could not himself
admit the infant into a hospital because he Third District, Salt Lake County
lacked malpractice insurance, so would have Honorable Pat B. Brian
to call another physician or have the infant ATTORNEYS:
admitted through an emergency room facility;
Ivy testified .that defendant only told her to Bryce E. Roe, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
and Cross-Respondent
watch the infant for changes in his temperature, color and respiration, without advising E.H. Fankhauser, Salt Lake City, for
her as to the degree of change which might
Respondent and Cross-Appellant
indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or Before Judges Bench, Billings, and
Joanne that death could result > from the Greenwood. tpOPINION
- disease; and defendant left the infant in die
cart of laypersons.
SELLINGS, Jndge:
There was other, conflicting evidence which
Regional Saks Agency, Inc. ('Regional")
wpuld indicate that defendant should not have
appeals from a jury verdict awarding it
been aware that a substantial risk existed.
S792.lt in damages as a result; of crossHowever, the existence of conflicting evidence,
appellant Rokri Rekhert*s <Ttfr^ Rptficrt*)
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury
breach of a non-competition agreement with
verdkt. State r. Tabu** 775 P.2d 422, 424Regional, his former employer. Regional abo
25 (Utah CL App. 1989). The jury has been
appeals the trial court's reduction of Its atto- through the arduous task of listening to and
rney fees which Regional daixns were provided
swetstng the evidence presented in this most
for by the parties' written contract and reasdifficult case, and I do not think that we
onably incurred in prosecuting this action.
should appropriately substitute our judgment
Mr. Rekhert cross-appeals the court's
fc: that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was
based on what defendant knew or the jury de*L«l of his attempt to an»end his countercbelieved he knew at the time, and its assess- laim to add a daim for unpaid commissions
ment that given that knowledge he should and salary. We reverse and remand In, part,
have known the risks. I do not find the evid- and affirm in part.
Since the late 1950s, Edward and Helen
ence 'sufficiently inconclusive,9 as do my
colleagues, to justify conviction. I would JGbolm have operated a small family business
conclude that the record, while heatedly con- which acted as a manufacturer's representative
troverted, contains sufficient evidence for the inrirsignatfriterritories of the mountain west.
jury to conclude that defendant should, have The business earned commissions from ita
been aware tfeat a substantial and unjustified prindpal manufacturers by selling their foock
.
\ . . V
~
risk of death existed, and to convict defendant to retatag*,' In
1977.
the
Khoims
hired
MrT
Rekhert
as
&f negligent homicide as a result.
an Independent contractor to handle outside
Pamela T. Greenwood* Judge
sales. If the relationship was satisfactory, the
Kiholms Intended to retire in ten years with
Mr. Rekhert taking over the'Wness. Mr.
Rekhert worked for the KStgtmTuntfl J97S .
when the business was ineor&ratei as Regional* * \ -V.
In 1979, Mr. Rekhert entered Into a written
employupnt contract with Regional. The
employment contract contains a non-
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Defendant finally claims that his right to
compulsory process and discovery was denied by the quashing of his subpoenas duces tecum at the preliminary hearing. In
quashing defendant's subpoenas, the magistrate instructed defendant to follow the
provisions of rule 16 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure in his discovery efforts.
Defendant apparently followed this instruction with the State's cooperation. The
record is devoid of any expression of dissatisfaction or objection to this method of
discovery, and there is no evidence that
defendant was prejudiced.
Having reviewed defendant's other
claims of error, we find them to be without
merit.
Affirmed.
HOWE, Associate C.J., and
STEWART and DURHAM, JJ., concur.
ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the
result.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
David R. WARDEN, Jr., M.D.,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 880575-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 22, 1989.
Rehearing Denied Jan. 29, 1990.
Physician was convicted of negligent
homicide in regard to his home delivery of
infant by the Second Circuit Court, Layton
Department, K. Roger Bean, J., and physician appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Bench, J., held that: (1) expert testimony
was required; (2) experts were properly

qualified; and (3) evidence was insufficient
to support conviction.
Reversed.
Greenwood, J., filed opinion concurring
in part and dissenting in part.
1. Homicide <£=»74
Negligent homicide involves defendant's perception of risk and necessarily
requires evaluation of his or her state of
mind.
2. Homicide <s=282
Whether defendant negligently fails to
perceive risk and thus is guilty of negligent
homicide is question of fact for jury.
3. Homicide <s=*230
Expert testimony is not required to
prove mental state of criminal defendant
accused of homicide.
4. Homicide <£=>250
Expert testimony was required in trial
of physician for negligent homicide of infant he delivered at mother's home; without understanding of nature and degree of
risk, jury could not determine whether risk
was substantial and if so, whether physician's failure to perceive it was grossly
negligent and risk was not one within common knowledge and experience of laypersons.
5. Cimina! Law <s=479
State's medical witnesses were properly qualified as experts to testify against
physician charged with negligent homicide
in home delivery of infant, despite fact that
experts did not attend home deliveries; no
board certification or recognized medical
specialty in home delivery existed and
medical principles applicable to delivery of
infants were applicable regardless of
whether birth occurs at home or in hospital.
6. Homicide <s=*250
Evidence was insufficient to sustain
conviction of physician on -charge of negligent homicide in home delivery of infant, in
regard to physician's failure to hospitalize
infant who was born with respiratory distress; expert medical witnesses testified
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that when physician left patient's home,
baby's vital signs were acceptable, and that
it was very unusual for child to die at this
gestation and birth weight from hyaline
membrane disease.

primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy
had given birth at home to four of her
seven children. Based on this evaluation,
defendant decided that Joanne was a suitable candidate for home delivery and
agreed to attend the birth. He also made
arrangements to obtain Joanne's medical
Darwin C. Hansen, Bountiful, for defen- records from her previous doctor, and on
dant and appellant.
the basis of that information and his own
Melvin C. Wilson and Brian J. Namba, examination, calculated her delivery date to
Farmington, for plaintiff and respondent. be in early December.
On the morning of November 7, Joanne
OPINION
began experiencing vaginal bleeding. Ivy
Before BENCH, GREENWOOD and
called defendant, who was in Salt Lake
BULLOCK,1 JJ.
City at the time. Defendant expressed concern that labor was beginning and advised
BENCH, Judge:
Ivy to confine Joanne to bed and to contact
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of him immediately if the bleeding became
negligent homicide, a class A misdemeanor, heavier or if strong contractions began.
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206 That afternoon, Ivy called defendant again
(1978). We reverse the conviction.
and told him that the bleeding had stopped.
She also told him that she had spoken with
FACTS
the father of the child and that he had told
Defendant David R. Warden, Jr., is a her that conception had occurred a month
licensed and board-certified physician who earlier than originally believed. Defendant
began practicing family medicine in Kays- testified that this information led him to
ville, Utah, in 1968. As part of his prac- think that the labor was not premature,
tice, defendant provides obstetrical care, and he advised her to call again as labor
and estimates that he has attended approxi- continued. Ivy did so that evening, reportmately 2500 births, 300 of which have been ing that Joanne was having occasional contractions. Defendant told her to call back
home deliveries.
when
the contractions were three to five
In September 1986, defendant was visitminutes
apart. At about 10:15 p.m., Ivy
ed in his office by Joanne Young, who
informed
defendant that the final stage of
consulted defendant because she was preglabor
had
begun. Defendant arrived at the
nant out-of-wedlock and wanted to have
house
fifteen
minutes later.
her baby at home. Joanne testified that
she was embarrassed about her pregnancy
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech
and "didn't want to have to go to the birth to a male infant which appeared to be
hospital and have people know." She also healthy, but weighed only an estimated
expressed a desire to keep the expenses of four to five pounds. The baby exhibited
birth to a minimum. Defendant evaluated some respiratory distress which defendant
her for home delivery, considering the risks attributed to prematurity. Defendant tesof her pregnancy, the proximity of hospital tified that he suggested hospitalization of
facilities, and the availability of family sup- the infant to Ivy, but S * w Ivy was conport to care for the infant and mother after cerned because there was no health insurbirth. Defendant determined that Joanne's ance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied
pregnancy was low risk and that medical that she ever discussed with defendant hosfacilities were nearby. He also learned pitalization of the infant.) Defendant inthat Joanne's mother, Ivy, was to be the structed Ivy how to position the infant to
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989).
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relieve some of the respiratory distress and
showed Joanne how to nurse the baby. He
also instructed Ivy to keep the child warm
and to monitor the baby's temperature, color, and breathing. After instructing Ivy to
call him if there were any changes in the
baby's condition, defendant left at about
11:30 p.m.
During the night, Ivy moved Joanne and
the baby into a warmer room. Ivy noticed
that the child's hands and feet were "very
blue," but did not call defendant. At 8:00
a.m., the baby appeared to have stopped
breathing. Ivy attempted to resuscitate
him for about twenty minutes, and apparently the infant responded. She then
called defendant's office, but was told he
was at home. When Ivy called defendant's
home, his wife advised her he was not
there, but would be in his office by 9:30
a.m. In neither call did she identify herself, leave a message, nor report that there
was any emergency. She apparently was
aware defendant was not inaccessible in
such a situation, but did not make further
attempts to reach him. She did not take
the infant to the hospital or notify emergency services. She testified that in England, her native home, "you would have
had to have a doctor's permission to have
called an ambulance."
At about 8:30 a.m., Ivy called a friend
but did not tell her that the child was
having difficulty breathing. She also
called her clergyman, but did not advise
him until 9:30 or 10:00 a.m. that the baby
was having respiratory difficulty. The
clergyman called a local pediatrician, who
arrived at the Youngs' home at about 10:30
a.m. only to find the infant "lifeless." The
baby was taken to a hospital, but was
pronounced dead shortly after arrival.
A postmortem examination revealed that
the infant was born approximately six to
seven weeks premature and had died from
respiratory distress caused by prematurity
of the lungs (hyaline membrane disease).
Defendant subsequently was charged with
one count of negligent homicide.
An initial jury trial ended in a mistrial
prior to the rendition of a verdict. A second jury trial was held February 22-26,

1988, and defendant was convicted as
charged. Defendant's motions to arrest
judgment and for a new trial were denied.
ISSUES
Defendant raises essentially two issues
on appeal, arguing for a reversal of his
conviction. He first claims that the State's
expert witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the applicable medical standard
of care. Second, he argues that there was
insufficient evidence to establish that his
conduct deviated significantly from the applicable standard of care and that there
was a causal connection between his conduct and the baby's death.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
[1,2] Conduct constituting the crime of
negligent homicide occurs when an "actor,
acting with criminal negligence, causes the
death of another." Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-5-206(1) (1978). The culpable mental
state for criminal negligence requires "only
that a defendant 'ought to be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk' of
death." State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254,
267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-2-103(4) (1978)); see also 2 C. Torcia,
Wharton's Criminal Law § 168 (14th ed.
1979). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must be of
such a nature and degree that the failure
to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation
from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4)
(1978). Consequently, negligent homicide
involves a defendant's perception of risk
and necessarily requires an evaluation of
his or her state of mind. State v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523, 525-26 (Utah Ct.App.
1989). Whether a defendant negligently
fails to perceive the risk is a question of
fact for the jury. See State v. Howard,
597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979). However,
the risk of death "must be of such a degree
that an ordinary person would not ... fail
to recognize it." State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d
142, 148 (Utah 1983).
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Because the "failure to perceive the risk
constitutes a gross deviation from the reasonable man standard/' ordinary negligence adequate in the civil law is insufficient to constitute criminal negligence.
State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 (Utah
1979); see also Standiford, 769 P.2d at
267; 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law
§ 168 (terms such as "criminal negligence''
are intended to connote deviations from
reasonableness significantly greater in degree than ordinary negligence). Thus,
"[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment
resulting even in death of another is not
criminal unless the quality of the act makes
it so." People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal.
App.2d 433, 8 Cal.Rptr. 863, 868 (1960).
EXPERT TESTIMONY
[3] Defendant contends that expert testimony was required in this case to establish the "standard of care," but that the
State's medical experts were not qualified
to testify. On the other hand, the State
argues that expert medical testimony was
not required, and that it needed only to
present "competent evidence to show the
nature and degree of risk and the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint." The State correctly observes that
the "standard of care" in section 76-2103(4) refers to the actor's mental state, as
opposed to medical malpractice cases in
which expert medical testimony is required
to show the applicable standard of medical
care. See, e.g., Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763
P.2d 817, 821 (Utah CtApp.1988). It is
also true that expert testimony is not required to prove the mental state of a criminal defendant accused of homicide. See
State v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah
1978).
[4] We conclude, however, that expert
testimony was required in this case since
such testimony was necessary to establish
the nature and degree of risk. Section
76-5-206(1) requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's
judgment was criminally deficient because
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to the
subjective intent of the defendant, i.e., "the actor's viewpoint," which need not be accepted by

he failed to perceive a substantial risk that
death could occur. Without an understanding of the nature and degree of risk,
the jury could not determine whether the
risk was substantial, and if so, whether
defendant's failure to perceive it was
grossly negligent. Unless the risk is one
within the common knowledge and experience of laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury
could make an informed determination of
culpability.2 We believe that expert testimony is required where criminal negligence
is alleged and the nature and degree of risk
are beyond the ken of the average layperson. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Ward, 422
F.Supp. 934 (W.D.N.Y.1976) (State's use of
expert medical testimony at trial supplied
sufficient evidence of criminal negligence
for negligent homicide conviction in death
of mother on whom physician had performed legal abortion).
[5] Defendant argues that the State's
expert medical witnesses did not qualify as
experts because they do not attend home
deliveries. The witnesses included two obstetrician/gynecologists, a pediatrician, and
a neonatologist. Citing the medical malpractice case of Burton v. Youngblood,
711 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school of medicine is not competent to testify as an expert against the
practitioner of another school), defendant
argues that the State's doctors were not
qualified to testify because they were of a
different school of medicine than defendant.
The qualification of an expert witness is
a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial court. State v. Espinoza, 723 P.2d
420, 421 (Utah 1986). There was evidence
in the record that there is no board certification or recognized medical specialty in
home delivery. There was also evidence
that the medical principles applicable to the
delivery of babies are applicable whether a
birth occurs at home or in a hospital. In
view of the record evidence, the trial court
was within its discretion to qualify the
State's medical witnesses as experts. Cf
the court and which is ultimately a determination for the jury.
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Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and
procedures of general plastic surgeon were
shown to be identical to those of specialized
plastic surgeon, one may testify against
the other); Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985)
(nothing precludes testimony from expert
in another trade if the standard is the same
for both). 'The critical factor in determining the competency of an expert is whether
that expert has knowledge that can assist
the trier of fact in resolving the issues
before it" Id. at 253; see also Utah
R.Evid. 702. We conclude that the trial
court committed no abuse of discretion in
allowing the State's experts to testify.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
[6] Defendant claims that the evidence
presented was insufficient to establish
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To convict a person of violating section 76-5206(1), the State must establish, beyond a
reasonable doubt, both prohibited conduct
and a culpable mental state. To establish a
culpable mental state, the prosecution must
present evidence that defendant was unaware of a substantial and unjustifiable
risk of death, but should have been so
aware.
We review defendant's claim under a
standard that does not permit us to substitute our judgment for that of the jury in a
criminal trial. See State v. Tolman, 775
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah Ct.App.1989). Rather,
we review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it
in the light most favorable to the verdict
of the jury. We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant, committed the crime of which he
was convicted.
State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah
1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d
443, 444 (Utah 1983)); see also State v.
Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477. (Utah 1989).
Defendant testified at trial that the
grandparents weighed the newborn baby

and determined it to be about five pounds.
Defendant also said he believed the baby to
be two to three weeks premature. Defendant was aware that the baby was having
"grunting respirations," which he said was
a sign of early respiratory distress syndrome. Defendant positioned the baby in
such a way that the labored breathing was
relieved. He further testified that the severity of the respiratory distress did not
indicate a need for hospitalization. He said
that he informed Ivy that the baby was
premature and had difficulty in breathing,
but that the baby was then stable. He
instructed Ivy to call him if there was any
change and admitted that he was depending on Ivy to carefully watch the infant
Before leaving the Young residence, defendant noted that the respiratory difficulty
had subsided. He stated, 'The baby was
respiring well, the baby was still awake
and alert and muscle tone was still good."
He also said,
I was impressed that the baby had already shown some signs of respiratory
distress syndrome, but under similar circumstances in the past, I have left babies
at home, having instructed the mother on
how to nurse, having instructed the
mother to keep the baby warm and therefore I felt I could leave, confident that
grandma would call me, confident that if
there were any progression of symptoms
that I would be called.
Defendant later ^ testified that of 300
home births he had attended, approximately ten of those babies had been premature.
Eight of those had had respiratory distress,
but defendant said that he had hospitalized
only three of those eight In the case of
this infant, defendant testified that "in my
experience and the judgment that I applied
at the time based on experience with babies
who are even smaller than this delivered at
home, they can in many cases get along
very, very well
"
The State's expert medical witnesses testified that although the mother and baby
"would do better" in a hospital, defendant's
evaluation of the infant's well-being would
indicate that the baby's vital signs were
"acceptable." They conceded that the in-
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fant may have survived had he been hospitalized up to ten hours after birth, but
believed that leaving the baby at home was
"bad judgment" on defendant's part.3
The State's neonatologist testified that
hyaline membrane disease is a progressive
disease. He also indicated that a baby in
the condition of the deceased is typically
"at high risk for medical and surgical problems." As far as mortality for an infant
with the disease, however, he stated that
the failure to provide therapy would only
place the probability of death at five to
fifteen percent. He later stated upon
cross-examination that statistically only
two percent of babies die from untreated
hyaline membrane disease. He further
said, "I guess the message is it's very
unusual and rare to lose a baby at this
gestation and this birth weight from hyaline membrane disease."
Asked whether it would be outside the
medical standard of care to have the family
of a home-delivered newborn to monitor
any changes in the baby's condition, the
neonatologist believed it was, but conceded
that other competent physicians would disagree with him. Other experts for the
State testified that the medical community
in Utah does not teach or train physicians
for home delivery and generally recommends against it.
We are convinced that even looking at
the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, that evidence was "sufficiently
inconclusive" to establish that there was a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death
such that defendant should have been
aware of it. Thus in examining the evidence presented, reasonable minds must
have entertained "a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted." See Booker, 709
P.2d at 345.
Since we conclude that the evidence
failed to establish criminal negligence, we
need not reach the issue whether defen3. Our research has revealed very few cases in
which licensed physicians have been charged
with negligent homicide. In many of those
cases where such a charge has been brought,
albeit under differing statutes, the courts have

dant's acts or omissions were the legal
cause of death.
Defendant's conviction is reversed.
BULLOCK, J., concurs.
GREENWOOD, Judge: (concurring
and dissenting).
I concur in Judge Bench's opinion concerning expert testimony, but dissent from
the opinion's conclusion that there was not
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury's
conviction of negligent homicide. The majority opinion correctly states the necessary
quantum of evidence for negligent homicide as being where the defendant should
have been aware of a substantial and unjustified risk of death, but was not. State
v. Wessendorf, 777 P.2d 523, 525 (Utah
Ct.App. 1989). Also, the risk must be such
that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to recognize it. State v.
Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983).
Therefore, in this case, the State was required to convince the jury that there was
a substantial and unjustified risk that the
infant would die if he did not receive medical care in a hospital-type setting; that
defendant was unaware that the risk existed; and that an ordinary person in defendant's position would have recognized that
risk. Our task as an appellate court, is to
determine if the evidence presented, when
viewed favorably to the jury verdict, "is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d
342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (1983)).
My assessment of the evidence supporting the jury verdict is as follows: defendant was a licensed physician who had
maintained a family practice since 1968,
including obstetrical care; defendant assumed responsibility for the infant's physical well-being by agreeing to deliver it at
held that no criminal liability attaches when
death results from an error of judgment. See
generally Annotation, Homicide Predicated on
Improper Treatment of Disease or Injury, 45 A.L.
R.3d 114 (1972).
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home; defendant did not insist on examining the mother when she reported vaginal
bleeding to determine if premature birth
was likely or if so, what precautions should
be taken to minimize the likelihood of premature birth; defendant diagnosed the infant after birth as having Respiratory Distress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to
position the infant in a way which relieved
the symptoms but would not alleviate the
condition itself; defendant minimized the
seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy
and Joanne; three of the ten children he
had delivered who had Respiratory Distress Syndrome were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant could die from the
disease and that the disease was progressive; defendant could not himself admit the
infant into a hospital because he lacked
malpractice insurance, so would have to
call another physician or have the infant
admitted through an emergency room facility; Ivy testified that defendant only told
her to watch the infant for changes in his
temperature, color and respiration, without
advising her as to the degree of change
which might indicate a crisis, nor did he
warn her or Joanne that death could result
from the disease; and defendant left the
infant in the care of laypersons.

stantial and unjustified risk of death existed, and to convict defendant of negligent
homicide as a result.

REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, INC., a
Utah corporation, Plaintiff, Appellant,
and Cross-Respondent,
v.
Roland W. REICHERT, Defendant,
Respondent, and Cross-Appellant
No. 880246-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 24, 1989.
Employer brought action against salesman for breach of noncompetition agreement. After denying salesman's motion to
amend counterclaim, the Third District
Court, Salt Lake County, Pat B. Brian, J.,
entered judgment on jury verdict awarding
slightly less than $800 in damages and
awarded contractual attorney fees in
amount of $7,500 rather than almost $27,000 that had been sought. Parties appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held
that: (1) salesman bore burden of proving
that there was no reasonable relationship
between actual damages suffered by employer as result of his breach and amount
employer would collect under agreement's
liquidated damages provision; (2) liquidated damages provision was not unreasonable as a matter of law; (3) unexplained
reduction of attorney fees sought could not
stand on appeal; and (4) motion to amend
counterclaim was properly denied.

There was other, conflicting evidence
which would indicate that defendant should
not have been aware that a substantial risk
existed. Hr^rever, the existence of conflicting evidence, by itself, does not justify
reversal of'a jury verdict. State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424-25 (Utah CtApp.
1989). The jury has been through the arduous task of listening to and assessing the
evidence presented in this most difficult
case, and I do not think that we should
appropriately substitute our judgment for
that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was
based on what defendant knew or the jury
be^eved he knew at the time, and its assessment that given that knowledge he
should have known the risks. I do not find
Affirmed in part, reversed and rethe evidence "sufficiently inconclusive/' as manded in part.
do my colleagues, to justify conviction. I .
would conclude that the record, while heatedly controverted, contains sufficient evi- 1. Damages <s=>163(3)
dence for the jury to conclude that defenIn context of noncompetition agreedant should have been aware that a sub- ment's liquidated damages provision, sales-
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Before Judges Bench, Greenwood, and Bullock.1
BENCH, Judge:
Defendant appeals his jury conviction of negligent homicide,
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206
(1978). We reverse the conviction.
FACTS
Defendant David R. Warden, Jr., is a licensed and boardcertified physician who began practicing family medicine in
Kaysville, Utah, in 1968. As part of his practice, defendant
provides obstetrical care, and estimates that he has attended
approximately 2500 births, 300 of which have been home
deliveries.
In September 1986, defendant was visited in his office by
Joanne Young, who consulted defendant because she was pregnant
out-of-wedlock and wanted to have her baby at home. Joanne
1. J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sitting by special
appointment pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.
1989) .
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testified that she was embarrassed about her pregnancy and
"didn't want to have to go to the hospital and have.peopleknow.'9 She also expressed a desire to keep the expenses*ot
birth to a minimum. Defendant evaluated her for home delivery,
considering the risks of her pregnancy, the proximity of
hospital facilities, and the availability of family support to
care for the infant and mother after birth. Defendant
determined that Joanne's pregnancy was low risk and that medical
facilities were nearby. He also learned that Joanne's mother,
Ivy, was to be the primary caretaker after birth and that Ivy
had given birth at home to four of her seven children. Based on
this evaluation, defendant decided that Joanne was a suitable
candidate for home delivery and agreed to attend the birth. He
also made arrangements to obtain Joanne's medical records from
her previous doctor, and on the basis of that information and
his own examination, calculated her delivery date to be in early
December.
On the morning of November 7, Joanne began experiencing
vaginal bleeding. Ivy called defendant, who was in Salt Lake
City at the time. Defendant expressed concern that labor was
beginning and advised Ivy to confine Joanne to bed and to
contact him immediately if the bleeding became heavier or if
strong contractions began. That afternoon, Ivy called defendant
again and told him that the bleeding had stopped. She also told
him that she had spoken with the father of the child and that he
had told her that conception had occurred a month earlier than
originally believed. Defendant testified that this information
led him to think that the labor was not premature, and he
advised her to call again as labor continued. Ivy did so that
evening, reporting that Joanne was having occasional
contractions. Defendant told her to call back when the
contractions were three to five minutes apart. At about 10:15
p.m., Ivy informed defendant that the final stage of labor had
begun. Defendant arrived at the house fifteen minutes later.
Shortly thereafter, Joanne gave breech birth to a male
infant which appeared to be healthy, but weighed only an
estimated four to five pounds. The baby exhibited some
respiratory distress which defendant attributed to prematurity.
Defendant testified that he suggested hospitalization of the
infant to Ivy, but that Ivy was concerned because there was no
health insurance to cover those expenses. (Ivy denied that she
ever discussed with defendant hospitalization of the infant.)
Defendant instructed Ivy how to position the infant to relieve
some of the respiratory distress and showed Joanne how to nurse
the baby. He also instructed Ivy to keep the child warm and to
monitor the baby's temperature, color, and breathing. After
instructing Ivy to call him if there were any changes in the
baby's condition, defendant left at about 11:30 p.m.
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During the night/ Ivy moved Joanne and the baby into a
warmer room. Ivy noticed that the child's hands and feet were
"very blue," but did not call defendant. At 8:00 a.m., the baby
appeared to have stopped breathing. Ivy attempted to
resuscitate him for about twenty minutes, and apparently the
infant responded. She then called defendant's office, but was
told he was at home. When Ivy called defendant's home, his wife
advised her he was not there, but would be in his office by 9:30
a.m. In neither call did she identify herself, leave a message,
nor report that there was any emergency. She apparently was
aware defendant was not inaccessible in such a situation, but
did not make further attempts to reach him. She did not take
the infant to the hospital or notify emergency services. She
testified that in England, her native home, "you would have had
to have a doctor's permission to have called an ambulance."
At about 8:30 a.m., Ivy called a friend but did not tell her
that the child was having difficulty breathing. She also called
her clergyman, but did not advise him until 9:30 or 10:00 a.m.
that the baby was having respiratory difficulty. The clergyman
called a local pediatrician, who arrived at the Youngs' home at
about 10:30 a.m. only to find the infant "lifeless." The baby
was taken to a hospital, but was pronounced dead shortly after
arrival.
A postmortem examination revealed that
approximately six to seven weeks premature
respiratory distress caused by prematurity
membrane disease). Defendant subsequently
count of negligent homicide.

the infant was born
and had died from
of the lungs (hyaline
was charged with one

An initial jury trial ended in a mistrial prior to the
rendition of a verdict. A second jury trial was held February
22-26, 1988, and defendant was convicted as charged.
Defendant's motions to arrest judgment and for a new trial were
denied.
ISSUES
Defendant raises essentially two issues on appeal, arguing
for a reversal of his conviction. He first claims that the
State's expert witnesses were not qualified to testify as to the
applicable medical standard of care. Second, he argues that
there was insufficient evidence to establish that his conduct
deviated significantly from the applicable standard of care and
that there was a causal connection between his conduct and the
baby's death.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Conduct constituting the crime of negligent homicide occurs
when an "actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the
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death of another.- Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-206(1) (1978). The
culpable mental state for criminal negligence requires "only
that a defendant 'ought to be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk' of death." State v, Standiford. 769 P.2d
254, 267 (Utah 1988) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4)
(1978)); see also 2 C. Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 168
(14th ed. 1979). Furthermore, "[t]he risk must be of such a
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary
person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(4) (1978).
Consequently, negligent homicide involves a defendant's
perception of risk and necessarily requires an evaluation of his
.or her state of mind. State v. Wessendorf. 777 P.2d 523, 525-26
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). Whether a defendant negligently fails to
perceive the risk is a question of fact for the jury. See State
v, Howard. 597 P.2d 878, 881 (Utah 1979). However, the risk of
death "must be of such a degree that an ordinary person would
not . . . fail to recognize it." State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142,
148 (Utah 1983).
Because the "failure to perceive the risk constitutes a
gross deviation from the reasonable man standard," ordinary
negligence adequate in the civil law is insufficient to
constitute criminal negligence. State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226,
1227 (Utah 1979); sea also Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267; 2 C.
Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 168 (terms such as "criminal
negligence" are intended to connote deviations from
reasonableness significantly greater in degree than ordinary
negligence). Thus, "[m]ere inattention or mistake in judgment
resulting even in death of another is not criminal unless the
quality of the act makes it so." People v. Rodriguez, 186 Cal.
App. 2d 433, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (1960).
EXPERT TESTIMONY
Defendant contends that expert testimony was required in
this case to establish the "standard of care," but that the
State's medical experts were not qualified to testify. On the
other hand, the State argues that expert medical testimony was
not required, and that it needed only to present "competent
evidence to show the nature and degree of risk and the
circumstances as viewed from the actorfs standpoint." The State
correctly observes that the "standard of care" in section
76-2-10°M) refers to the actor's mental state, as opposed to
medical malpractice cases in which expert medical testimony is
required to show the applicable standard of medical care. See,
e.g., Chadwick v. Nielsen. 763 P.2d 817, 821 (Utah Ct. App.
1988). It is also true that expert testimony is not required to
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant accused of
homicide. See State v. Nicholson, 585 P.2d 60, 63 (Utah 1978).
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We conclude/ however, that expert testimony was required in
this case since such testimony was necessary to establish the
nature and degree of risk. Section 76-5-206(1) requires the
State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's
judgment was criminally deficient because he failed to perceive
a substantial risk that death could occur. Without an
understanding of the nature and degree of risk, the jury could
not determine whether the risk was substantial, and if so,
whether defendant's failure to perceive it was grossly
negligent. Unless the risk is one within the common knowledge
and experience of laypersons, it is unlikely that a jury could
make an informed determination of culpability.2 We believe
that expert testimony is required where criminal negligence is
alleged and the nature and degree of risk are beyond the ken of
the average layperson. See, e.g., Ketchum v. Ward, 422 F. Supp.
934 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (State's use of expert medical testimony at
trial supplied sufficient evidence of criminal negligence for
negligent homicide conviction in death of mother on whom
physician had performed legal abortion).
Defendant argues that the State's expert medical witnesses
did not qualify as experts because they do not attend home
deliveries. The witnesses included two obstetrician/
gynecologists, a pediatrician, and a neonatologist. Citing the
medical malpractice case of Burton v. Youncrblood, 711 P.2d 245,
248 (Utah 1985) (a practitioner of one school of medicine is not
competent to testify as an expert against the practitioner of
another school), defendant argues that the State's doctors were
not qualified to testify because they were of a different school
of medicine than defendant.
The qualification of an expert witness is a matter within
the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Espinoza, 723
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1986). There was evidence in the record
that there is no board certification or recognized medical
specialty in home delivery. There was also evidence that the
medical principles applicable to the delivery of babies are
applicable whether a birth occurs at home or in a hospital. In
view of the record evidence, the trial court was within its
discretion to qualify the State's medical witnesses as experts.
££. Burton, 711 P.2d at 249 (if methods and procedures of
general plastic surgeon were shown to be identical to those of
specialized plastic surgeon, one may testify against the other);
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah
1985) (nothing precludes testimony from expert in anther trade
if the standard is the same for both). "The critical factor in
2. This is distinct from expert testimony as to~the subjective
intent of the defendant, i.e., "the actor's viewpoint," which
need not be accepted by the court and which is ultimately a
determination for the jury.
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determining the competency of an expert is whether that expert
has knowledge that can assist the trier of fact in resolving the
issues before it." I£. at 253; see also Utah R. Evid. 702. We
conclude that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion
in allowing the State's experts to testify.
SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE
Defendant claims that the evidence presented was
insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To
convict a person of violating section 76-5-206(1)/ the State
must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, both prohibited
conduct and a culpable mental state. To establish a culpable
mental state, the prosecution must present evidence that
defendant was unaware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of
death, but should have been so aware.
We review defendant's claim under a standard that does not
permit us to substitute our judgment for that of the jury in a
criminal trial. See State v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989). Rather,
we review the evidence and all inferences
which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury. We reverse a jury conviction for
insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that
reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was
convicted.
State v, Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v.
Petree, 659 P.2d-443, 444 (Utah 1983)); SSS. also State v.
Hopkins. 119 Utah Adv. Rep. 59, 60 (1989).
Defendant testified at trial that the grandparents weighed
the newborn baby and determined it to be about five pounds.
Defendant also said he believed the baby to be two to three
weeks premature. Defendant was aware that the baby was having
"grunting respirations," which he said was a sign of early
respiratory distress syndrome. Defendant positioned the baby in
such a way that the labored breathing was relieved. He further
testified that the se\~.ity c r the respiratory distress did not
indicate a need for hospitalization. He said that he informed
Ivy that the baby was premature and had difficulty in breathing,
but that the baby was then stable. He instructed Ivy to call
him if there was any change and admitted that he was depending
on Ivy to carefully watch the infant. Before leaving the Young
residence, defendant noted that the respiratory difficulty had
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subsided. He stated, "The baby was respiring well, the baby was
still awake and alert and muscle tone was still good.* He also
said,
I was impressed that the baby had already
shown some signs of respiratory distress
syndrome, but under similar circumstances in
the past, I have left babies at home, having
instructed the mother on how to nurse,
having instructed the mother to keep the
baby warm and therefore I felt I could
leave, confident that grandma would call me,
confident that if there were any progression
of symptoms that I would be called.
Defendant later testified that of 300 home births he had
attended, approximately ten of those babies had been premature.
Eight of those had had respiratory distress, but defendant said
that he had hospitalized only three of those eight. In the case
of this infant, defendant testified that "in my experience and
the judgment that I applied at the time based on experience with
babies who are even smaller than this delivered at home, they
can in many cases get along very, very well • • . ."
The State's expert medical witnesses testified that although
the mother and baby "would do better" in a hospital, defendant's
evaluation of the infant's well-being would indicate that the
baby's vital signs were "acceptable." They conceded that the
infant may have survived had he been hospitalized up to ten
hours after birth, but believed that leaving the baby at home
was "bad judgment" on defendant's part.3
The State's neonatologist testified that hyaline membrane
disease is a progressive disease. He also indicated that a baby
in the condition of the deceased is typipally "at high risk for
medical and surgical problems." As far as mortality for an
infant with the disease, however, he stated that the failure to
provide therapy would only place the probability of death at
five to fifteen percent. He later stated upon cross-examination
that statistically only two percent of babies die from untreated
hyaline membrane disease. He further said, "I guess the message
is it's very unusual and rare to lose a baby at this gestation
and this birth weight from hyaline membrane disease."
3. Our research has revealed very few cases in which licensed
physicians have been charged with negligent homicide. In many
of those cases where such a charge has been brought, albeit
under differing statutes, the courts have held that no criminal
liability attaches when death results from an error of
judgment. S£S generally Annotation, Homicide Predicated on
Improper Treatment of Disease or Iniurv, 45 A.L.R.3d 114 (1972).
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Asked whether it would be outside the medical standard of
care to have the family of a home-delivered newborn to monitor
any changes in the baby's condition, the neonatologist believed
it was, but conceded that other competent physicians would
disagree with him. This response merely reinforces our
conclusion that his testimony, as well as that of the other
experts for the State, must be construed in light of the fact
that home delivery, though legal, is not a widespread practice
by doctors in Utah, The State's experts testified that the
medical community in this state does not teach or train
physicians for home delivery and generally recommends against it.
We are convinced that even looking at the evidence in the
light most favorable to the verdict, that evidence was
"sufficiently inconclusive" to establish that there was a
substantial and unjustifiable risk of death such that defendant
should have been aware of it. Thus, reasonable minds could
examine the evidence presented and entertain "a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted." Sfi£ Booker. 709 P.2d at 345.
Since we conclude that the evidence failed to establish
criminal negligence, we need not reach the issue whether
defendant's acts or omissions were the legal cause of death.
Defendant's conviction is reversed.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

I CONCUR:

OJjrt..l.§..IOr>J_
Z4 Robert Bullock, Judge

GREENWOOD, Judge: (concurring and dissenting)
I concur in Judge Bench's opinion concerning expert
testimony, but dissent from the opinion's conclusion that there
was not sufficient evidence to su*/«din the jury's con/iction of
negligent homicide. The majority opinion correctly states the
necessary quantum of evidence for negligent homicide as being
where the defendant should have been aware of a substantial and
unjustified risk of death, but was not. State v. Wessendorf,
777 P.2d 523, 525 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Also, the risk must be
such that an ordinary person would not disregard or fail to
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recognize it. State v. Dver. 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 1983).
Therefore, in this case, the State was required to convince the
jury that there was a substantial and unjustified risk that the
infant would die if he did not receive medical care in a
hospital-type setting; that defendant was unaware that the risk
existed; and that an ordinary person in defendant's position
would have recognized that risk. Our task as an appellate
court, is to determine if the evidence presented, when viewed
favorably to the jury verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted." State v. Booker, 709 P.2d
342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 444
(1983)).
My assessment of the evidence supporting the jury verdict is
as follows: defendant was a licensed physician who had
maintained a family practice since 1968, including obstetrical
care; defendant assumed responsibility for the infant's physical
well-being by agreeing to deliver it at home; defendant did not
insist on examining the mother when she reported vaginal
bleeding to determine if premature birth was likely or if so,
what precautions should be taken to minimize the likelihood of
premature birth; defendant diagnosed the infant after birth as
having Respiratory Distress Syndrome; defendant advised Ivy to
position the infant in a way which relieved the symptoms but
would not alleviate the condition itself; defendant minimized
the seriousness of the infant's condition to Ivy and Joanne;
three of the ten children he had delivered who had Respiratory
Distress Syndrome were hospitalized; defendant knew the infant
could die from the disease and that the disease was progressive;
defendant could not himself admit the .infant into a hospital
because he lacked malpractice insurance, so would have to call
another physician or have the infant admitted through an
emergency room facility; Ivy testified that defendant only told
her to watch the infant for changes in his temperature, color
and respiration, without advising her as to the degree of change
which might indicate a crisis, nor did he warn her or Joanne
that death could result from the disease; and defendant left the
infant in the care of laypersons.
There was other, conflicting evidence which would indicate
that defendant should not have been aware that a substantial
risk existed. However, the existence of conflicting evidence,
by itself, does not justify reversal of a jury verdict. State
v. Tolman, 775 P.2d 422, 424-25 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). The jury
has been through the arduous task of listening to and assessing
the evidence presented in this most difficult case, and I do not
think that we should appropriately substitute our judgment for
that of the jury. The jury's conclusion was based on what
defendant knew or the jury believed he knew at the time, and its
assessment that given that knowledge he should have known the
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risks. I do not find the evidence "sufficiently inconclusive/"
as do my colleagues, to justify conviction. I would conclude
that the record/ while heatedly controverted/ contains
sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that defendant
should have been aware that a substantial and unjustified risk
of death existed/ and to convict defendant of negligent homicide
as a rasult.
t&mt^^r

/ '

Pamela T. Greenwood/ Judge
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D. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103(4) (1974)
76-2-103.

Definitions of Mintentionally, or with intent
or willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge";
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal
negligence or criminally negligent."

A person engages in conduct:
•

*

*

(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally
negligent
with
respect
to
circumstances
surrounding his conduct or the result of his
conduct when he ought to be aware of a substantial
and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances
exist or the result will occur• The risk must be
of such a nature and degree that the failure to
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the
standard of care that an ordinary person would
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from
the actor's standpoint.
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E. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-206 (1973)
76-5-206.

Negligent homicide.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent
homicide if the actor, acting with criminal
negligence, causes the death of another.
(2)
Negligent homicide is a class A
misdemeanor.
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F. Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2 et seq. (1953, as amended)
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdiction.
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer questions of
state law certified by a court of the United States.
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary
writs and authority to issue all writs and process necessary to carry into effect
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of Appeals prior
to final judgment by the Court of Appeals;
(c) discipline of lawyers;
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission;
(e) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicative proceedings originating with:
(i) the Public Service Commission;
(ii) the State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Board of State Lands and Forestry;
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; or
(v) the state engineer;
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under Subsection (e);
(g) afinaljudgment or decree of any court of record holding a statute of
the United States or this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah Constitution;
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record involving a charge of
a first degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the
Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Appeals any of the.
matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction,
except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an interlocutory order of a
court of record involving a charge of a capital felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers;
(e) general water adjudication;
(f) taxation and revenue; and
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3)(a) through (f).
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or denying a petition
for writ of certiorari for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, but the
Supreme Court shall review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals
under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
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